Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the external effects of the parent's decisions on the number of newly born children and the firm's decisions on the amount of polluting emissions that occur in industrial production. We employ an optimal control model which comprises three stock variables representing population, the economic capital stock and the pollutant immissions in the natural environment. We distinguish two different types of households, in which the decision on the number of births takes place. These two types may be regarded as two extremes: dynastic households, in which the family sticks together forever * Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, and micro-households, in which children leave their parent's household immediately after birth. We conclude that in both cases the decentralized outcome is not optimal due to two externalities: one occurs in the individual decision on polluting emissions, the other one in the individual decision on the number of births. Terms of use: Documents inIt turns out that whereas the environmental externality is of the same form in both cases, the type of external effect from the household's decision on fertility is qualitatively different. The different types of population externalities require different policy instruments in order to internalize them. We discuss a Pigouvian tax on emissions as well as taxes on population: if an appropriate tax on the household size is applied in the case of dynastic households and an appropriate tax on children is applied in the case of small households a first best development of the economy is obtained.JEL-Classification: J18, O13, Q25

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We analyze the optimal dynamic scale and structure of a two-sectoreconomy, where each sector produces one consumption good and one specific pollutant. Both pollutants accumulate at different rates to stocks which damage the natural environment. This acts as a dynamic driving force for the economy. Our analysis shows that along the optimal time-path (i) the overall scale of economic activity may be less than maximal; (ii) the time scale of economic dynamics (change of scale and structure) is mainly determined by the lifetime of pollutants, their harmfulness and the discount rate; and (iii) the optimal control of economic scale and structure may be non-monotonic. These results raise important questions about the optimal design of environmental policies.

Nutzungsbedingungen: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung-keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. Terms of use: This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution-no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, nontransferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, noncommercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public. By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use. Krise und Reform des Sozialstaates * Eine wirtschaftsethische Analyse des ethischen Dilemmas der ökonomischen Sozialstaatsreformvorschläge CHRISTIAN BECKER UND FRANK JÖST ** Restructuring the Welfare State: A Business Ethics Analysis of the Ethical Dilemma of Economic Proposals This paper discusses the crucial role normative aspects play in the context of economic proposals for restructuring the welfare state. We identify the ethical and economic dimension of a welfare state reform, and analyse their complex relationship. In particular, we show that economic proposals for restructuring the welfare state do not refer to ethical aspects explicitly or in an encompassing manner. Rather, they implicitly contain certain value statements and, thus, lead to an implicit shift of social values. We show that this commingling of positive and normative statements is systematically grounded in the fundamentals of economics. The business ethics approach enables the analysis and identification of the normative aspects of economic proposals, and their integration into an explicit debate on social values, the economy, and the welfare state. From our analysis we draw methodological conclusions on the general inter-and transdisciplinary character of business ethics.

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