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In his effort to provide sociology with a theory of behavior for the microfoundation of social phenomena, Raymond Boudon searched for a theory that could be presented as general (i.e., a theory that, given its strength, can be used "by default" in explanations). In this search, Boudon disregarded biological causes and stated that his Theory of Ordinary Rationality was the best choice, since it offers final explanations: when a behavior is explained as a result of beliefs that are grounded on good reasons, we are offering a black-box-free explanation. In this paper, I shall state that there are serious problems in the arguments that Boudon used to dismiss the explanatory strategy based on "biological causes". Secondly, I shall point out that some recent findings of several behavioral sciences constitute a radical questioning of the value of his Theory of Ordinary Rationality, as well as a positive revaluation of Evolutionary Psychology. In light of these findings, we can state that on many occasions, either reasons are systematically biased by biological causes, or these causes cause behavior, thus reasons are mere rationalizations. Therefore, neither the reason-based explanatory strategy nor the biological causes-based explanatory strategy can be used "by default". Given the current state of our knowledge, Evolutionary Psychology cannot stand as a general theory of behavior but is better placed to do the job in the future: it will depend on its ability to build models that integrate reasons and biological causes. Keywords: rationality; rationalism; reasons; evolutionary psychology; adapted mechanisms; biological causes; Raymond Boudon. Resumen. Razones y causas biológicas. Algunas reflexiones sobre la teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria de Boudon.En su esfuerzo por proveer a la sociología de una teoría del comportamiento con la que microfundamentar los fenómenos sociales, Raymond Boudon buscó una teoría que pudiese presentarse como general (es decir, una teoría que, dada su fortaleza, pudiera usarse «por defecto» en las explicaciones). En esta búsqueda, Boudon desconsideró las causas biológicas y defendió que su teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria era la mejor elección, pues ofrecía explicaciones finales: cuando una conducta se explica como resultado de creencias que están bien fundamentadas en buenas razones, estamos ofreciendo una explicación libre de «cajas negras». En este artículo, sostendré que existen serios problemas en los argumentos que usó Boudon para descartar la estrategia explicativa basada en las causas biológicas. En segundo lugar, señalaré que algunos hallazgos recientes de varias ciencias del comportamiento suponen un cuestionamiento radical del valor de su teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria así como una reevaluación positiva de la psicología evolucionista. A la luz de estos hallazgos, podemos sostener que, en muchas ocasiones, o bien las razones están sistemáticamente sesgadas por causas biológicas, o bien esas causas causan directamente la conducta, por lo que entonces las razones s...

This paper presents a multi-agent simulation of the production of step-level public goods in social networks. In previous public goods experimental research the design of the sequence ordering of decisions have been limited because of the necessity of simplicity taking priority over realism, which means they never accurately reproduce the social structure that constrains the available information. Multi-agent simulation can help us to overcome this limitation. In our model, agents are placed in 230 different networks and each networks' success rates are analyzed. We find that some network attributes -density and global degree centrality and heterogeneity-, some initial parameters of the strategic situation -the provision point-and some agents' attributes -beliefs about the probability that others will cooperate-, all have a significant impact on the success rate. Our paper is the first approach to an explanation for the scalar variant of production of public goods in a network using computational simulation methodology, and it outlines three main findings. (1) A less demanding collective effort level does not entail more success: the effort should neither be as high as to discourage others, nor so low as to be let to others. (2) More informed individuals do not always produce a better social outcome: a certain degree of ignorance about other agents' previous decisions and their probability of cooperating are socially useful as long as it can lead to contributions that would not have occurred otherwise. (3) Dense horizontal groups are more likely to succeed in the production of step-level public goods: social ties provide information about the relevance of each agent's individual contribution. This simulation demonstrates the explanatory power of the structural properties of a social system because agents with the same decision algorithm produce different outcomes depending on the properties of their social network.

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