Reasons and biological causes. Some reflections on Boudon’s Theory of Ordinary Rationality

Abstract

In his effort to provide sociology with a theory of behavior for the microfoundation of social phenomena, Raymond Boudon searched for a theory that could be presented as general (i.e., a theory that, given its strength, can be used "by default" in explanations). In this search, Boudon disregarded biological causes and stated that his Theory of Ordinary Rationality was the best choice, since it offers final explanations: when a behavior is explained as a result of beliefs that are grounded on good reasons, we are offering a black-box-free explanation. In this paper, I shall state that there are serious problems in the arguments that Boudon used to dismiss the explanatory strategy based on "biological causes". Secondly, I shall point out that some recent findings of several behavioral sciences constitute a radical questioning of the value of his Theory of Ordinary Rationality, as well as a positive revaluation of Evolutionary Psychology. In light of these findings, we can state that on many occasions, either reasons are systematically biased by biological causes, or these causes cause behavior, thus reasons are mere rationalizations. Therefore, neither the reason-based explanatory strategy nor the biological causes-based explanatory strategy can be used "by default". Given the current state of our knowledge, Evolutionary Psychology cannot stand as a general theory of behavior but is better placed to do the job in the future: it will depend on its ability to build models that integrate reasons and biological causes. Keywords: rationality; rationalism; reasons; evolutionary psychology; adapted mechanisms; biological causes; Raymond Boudon. Resumen. Razones y causas biológicas. Algunas reflexiones sobre la teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria de Boudon.En su esfuerzo por proveer a la sociología de una teoría del comportamiento con la que microfundamentar los fenómenos sociales, Raymond Boudon buscó una teoría que pudiese presentarse como general (es decir, una teoría que, dada su fortaleza, pudiera usarse «por defecto» en las explicaciones). En esta búsqueda, Boudon desconsideró las causas biológicas y defendió que su teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria era la mejor elección, pues ofrecía explicaciones finales: cuando una conducta se explica como resultado de creencias que están bien fundamentadas en buenas razones, estamos ofreciendo una explicación libre de «cajas negras». En este artículo, sostendré que existen serios problemas en los argumentos que usó Boudon para descartar la estrategia explicativa basada en las causas biológicas. En segundo lugar, señalaré que algunos hallazgos recientes de varias ciencias del comportamiento suponen un cuestionamiento radical del valor de su teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria así como una reevaluación positiva de la psicología evolucionista. A la luz de estos hallazgos, podemos sostener que, en muchas ocasiones, o bien las razones están sistemáticamente sesgadas por causas biológicas, o bien esas causas causan directamente la conducta, por lo que entonces las razones s...

Analytical sociology and its ‘syntax’ for explanation

“…However, there has been a certain resistance among analytical sociologists to empirically calibrate the models using the well-established advances of fields like genetics and evolutionary psychology/biology. AS should be more interested in the empirical advances that prove the relevant influence of biological forces in human behavior (León-Medina, 2014).…”

“…Should it be open to a more general framework that includes rational but also habitual, unreflecting behaviors (Kroneberg, 2010; Wikström, 2010)? What role should be reserved to heuristics (Manzo, 2012), identity (Edling and Rydgren, 2014), emotions (Elster, 2007) or even to genetics and evolution (León-Medina, 2014)? This article tackles this issue only partially.…”