The debate on the European Union's democratic deficit usually operates within a nationaldemocratic framework of analysis. This article argues for a change in methodology. It follows the thesis that the EU is a 'demoicracy' -a polity of multiple demoi -and has to be evaluated as such. Core principles of demoicracy are developed and the EU is assessed accordingly. Such an evaluation is not only more adequate, but also provides original insights: it is found that, whereas the constitutional development of the EU has approached demoicratic standards in general, major deficits remain at the national level.
Democratic theorists generally ignore that the institutional design of popular vote processes varies in important ways. However, these differences in design influence the kind of role that these processes play in and their impact on democratic systems. We intend to remedy this situation by launching a normative discussion about the institutional design of popular vote processes in the Debate “Do Referendums Enhance or Threaten Democracy?” In this introductory essay, we first insist on the necessity to adopt a differentiated conception of popular vote processes. We then highlight some aspects of our normative approach to the institutional design of popular vote processes. We finally argue that referendum processes can positively contribute to democratic systems when they are 1) launched bottom‐up and 2) legally binding.
In a 'demoi--cracy', separate statespeoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian features of policy--making, especially in value--laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but without a unified political community (demos). In its vertical dimension, demoi--cracy is based on the equality and interaction of citizens' and statespeoples' representatives in the making of common policies. Horizontally, it seeks to balance equal transnational rights of citizens with national policy--making autonomy. The EU belongs to the domain of demoi--cracy and has established many of its features. We argue that both vertical and horizontal demoi--cratization have been triggered by processes of supranational integration in the EU. They differ, however, in the origins and the outcomes. Vertical demoi--cratization has initially been a reaction of parliamentary institutional actors to majoritarian decision--making in regulatory policy--areas, resulting in the empowerment of the EP and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the national level. By contrast, horizontal demoi--cratization has been promoted by governments as an alternative to majoritarian and legally binding policy--making in core areas of statehood as well as coercive and redistributive policy--areas; it has resulted in soft, coordinative forms of policy--making, seeking to protect national autonomy. The extent to which these developments actually meet the normative standards of demoi--cracy in practice, however, is mixed.2
The Eurozone crisis has brought the imperative of democratic autonomy within the EU to the forefront, a concern at the core of demoicratic theory. The article seeks to move the scholarship on demoicratic theory a step further by exploring what we call the social construction of demoicratic reality. While the EU's legal-institutional infrastructure may imperfectly approximate a demoicratic structure, we need ask to what extent the 'bare bones' demoicratic character of a polity can actually be grounded in a full-flesh social construct that is or could be acted out in the democratic experience and the selfawareness of its peoples. Ultimately, such an enquiry should help us understand whether a polity like the EU is actually and potentially a stable or unstable political form. We develop a consistent theory of popular sovereignty drawing on John Searle and HLA Hart to conceive the constitutionalised people (dêmos) as a social fact and the sovereignty of the people as a status ascribed to the people. We use this construction of demoicratic reality as a conceptual framework to understand the possibility of popular sovereignty being exercised concurrently by several rather than just one dêmos.
The main aim of this final essay is to draw on the insights gathered in the Debate “Do Referendums Enhance or Threaten Democracy” to inform future normative and empirical discussions about the design of popular vote processes. We first offer some clarifications regarding three of the concerns raised by respondents about our introductory essay. We then propose a systematic classification of the lines of variation along which the design of popular vote processes usually varies. More precisely, we highlight nine lines of variation: trigger, origin of the text, legal basis, scope, trigger requirements, time, ballot, information, and decision rule. We conclude by emphasizing the relevance and necessity of debating the formal institutional design of popular vote processes.
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