a b s t r a c tThe bottom-line financial impact of supply chain management has been of continuing interest. Building on the operations strategy literature, Fisher's (1997) conceptual framework, a survey of 259 U.S. and European manufacturing firms, and secondary financial data, we investigate the relationship between supply chain fit (i.e., strategic consistencies between the products' supply and demand uncertainty and the underlying supply chain design) and the financial performance of the firm. The findings indicate that the higher the supply chain fit, the higher the Return on Assets (ROA) of the firm, and that firms with a negative misfit show a lower performance than firms with a positive misfit.

Exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. The goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal. We study a two-tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments. In the experiments, the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end-consumer demand than the human supplier. The supplier offers either a quantity discount contract (with two or three price blocks) or a price-only contract, contracts that are commonplace in practice, yet different in complexity. Results show that, contrary to theoretical predictions, quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier's profits. We also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts. These observations can be described with three decision biases (the probabilistic choice bias, the reinforcement bias, and the memory bias) and can be modeled using the experience-weighted attraction learning model. Our results demonstrate that simpler contracts, such as a price-only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks, are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information. This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations and supply chain management.behavioral operations management, all-unit quantity discount contracts, price-only contracts, complex contracts, contract performance, supply chain efficiency, asymmetric demand information, experience-weighted attraction learning model

Despite being theoretically suboptimal, simpler contracts (such as price‐only contracts and quantity discount contracts with limited number of price blocks) are commonly preferred in practice. Thus, exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. Using human subject experiments, Kalkancı et al. (2011) showed that such simpler contracts perform effectively for a supplier interacting with a computerized buyer under asymmetric demand information. We use a similar set of experiments with the modification that a human supplier interacts with a human buyer. We show that human interactions strengthen the supplier's preference for simpler contracts. We find that suppliers have fairness concerns even when they interact with computerized buyers. These fairness concerns tend to be even stronger when suppliers interact with human buyers, particularly when the complexity of the contract is low. We also find that suppliers are more prone to random decision errors (i.e., bounded rationality) when interacting with human buyers. In the absence of social preferences, Kalkancı et al. identified reinforcement and bounded rationality as key biases that impact suppliers' decisions. In human‐to‐human experiments, we find evidence for social preference effects. However, these effects may be secondary to bounded rationality.

A multidisciplinary effort among SUMC Transfusion Service, SBC, and experts in supply chain management resulted in a process improvement, which reduced the rate of PLT outdate at both SBC and SUMC Transfusion Service down to 9%, with a significant cost reduction of more than half a million dollars per year.

To motivate buyers to increase their order quantity, suppliers often rely on a well-established and widely used approach--they offer quantity discounts. This practice is in large part driven to obtain improved economies in transportation through higher truckload utilization. Recently, transportation rates, which are increasing faster than other costs, have become a larger portion of total net landed cost, placing the traditional quantity-discount practices under scrutiny. Many suppliers are left perplexed as to why their approach is not effective anymore, and some are even concerned that their overall profits may have actually decreased due to their discount parameters. In this paper, we study a multiperiod model, with a buyer facing stochastic end-item demand and a supplier offering an all-units quantity discount to him, to understand better the dynamics of such systems. We provide guidelines and insights on how to set effective discount parameters, and when not to expect much from them. We derive the optimal policy of the buyer, develop insights as to why the policy is complex, study the supplier's profit as a function of her offered quantity-discount scheme (accommodating the buyer's optimal policy), and discover a new phenomenon that is distinct and structurally different from the well-known bullwhip effect.all-unit quantity discounts, inventory management, stochastic demand, periodic review policies, minimum-order quantity

A manufacturer must choose whether to delegate component procurement to her tier 1 supplier or control it directly. Because of information asymmetry about suppliers' production costs and the use of simple quantity discount or price-only contracts, either delegation or control can yield substantially higher expected profit for the manufacturer. Delegation tends to outperform control when (1) the manufacturer is uncertain about the tier 1 supplier's cost and believes that it is likely to be high; (2) the manufacturer and the tier 1 supplier know the tier 2 supplier's cost or at least that it will be high; (3) the manufacturer has an alternative to engaging the tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers, such as in-house production; and (4) the firms use price-only contracts as opposed to quantity discount contracts. These results shed light on practices observed in the electronics industry.

This paper analyzes decentralized assembly systems under asymmetric demand information and sequential contracting. We reveal new insights on the value of contract type (price-only versus complex), demand information (complete versus asymmetric), and contract sequence (first mover versus second mover) to different players. Our results for the basic model show the following: (1) Complex contracts increase the suppliers' aggregate profit; however, individual suppliers do not necessarily benefit from a complex contracting equilibrium. We identify the conditions under which each supplier benefits from such an equilibrium. (2) Eliminating information asymmetry is not always beneficial for the suppliers because obtaining information might bring only marginal value and hence might not be realistically justified. Furthermore, a downstream supplier might prefer information asymmetry to complete information, especially when demand variability is moderate. (3) Unless there is a high demand risk, the first-mover advantage is prevalent when the assembler is a price-taker. We extend our basic model to analyze two additional scenarios. First, we study cases where the suppliers may offer contracts of different complexity. Beyond enriching our understanding of contract choice in decentralized assembly systems, such variations enhance the analysis beyond the standard methodology of principal-agent models and utilize solution techniques from optimal control. Second, we analyze the situation where the suppliers may possess different levels of information on demand under complex contracts. We show that an upstream supplier always benefits from a downstream supplier's superior information. However, the additional information might decrease the downstream supplier's profit, especially when the forecast variability is low compared to the total demand variability in the system. Our results for the basic model and its extensions confirm that studying interactions between suppliers, specifically under different contract types and information structures, in assembly systems presents rich opportunities for future research.

Introduction Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery is a well-established, commonly performed treatment for coronary artery disease—a disease that affects over 10% of US adults and is a major cause of morbidity and mortality. In 2005, the mean cost for a CABG procedure among Medicare beneficiaries in the USA was $32 201±$23 059. The same operation reportedly costs less than $2000 to produce in India. The goals of the proposed study are to (1) identify the difference in the costs incurred to perform CABG surgery by three Joint Commission accredited hospitals with reputations for high quality and efficiency and (2) characterise the opportunity to reduce the cost of performing CABG surgery. Methods and analysis We use time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC) to quantify the hospitals’ costs of producing elective, multivessel CABG. TDABC estimates the costs of a given clinical service by combining information about the process of patient care delivery (specifically, the time and quantity of labour and non-labour resources utilised to perform each activity) with the unit cost of each resource used to provide the care. Resource utilisation was estimated by constructing CABG process maps for each site based on observation of care and staff interviews. Unit costs were calculated as a capacity cost rate, measured as a $/min, for each resource consumed in CABG production. Multiplying together the unit costs and resource quantities and summing across all resources used will produce the average cost of CABG production at each site. We will conclude by conducting a variance analysis of labour costs to reveal opportunities to bend the cost curve for CABG production in the USA. Ethics and dissemination All our methods were exempted from review by the Stanford Institutional Review Board. Results will be published in peer-reviewed journals and presented at scientific meetings.