Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, some subjects report experiences of thinking that do not involve words or any other symbols (Hurlburt and Heavey 2006; Hurlburt and Akhter 2008). Even though the possibility of this unsymbolized thinking has consequences for the debate on the phenomenological status of cognitive states, the phenomenon is still insufficiently examined. This paper analyzes the main properties of unsymbolized thinking and advances an explanation of its origin. According to our analysis, unsymbolized thoughts appear as propositional states, that is, they are experienced as compositional conceptual phenomena, with semantic and syntactic features analogous to those of the contents of utterances. Based on this characterization we hypothesize that unsymbolized thinking is continuous with the activity of inner speech, in particular, it is a form of inner speech where the speech action is aborted even before the intention to talk is implemented by motor commands. We contend that this account provides the best explanation of the distinctive features of the phenomenon, and it helps to understand the sense of agency and ownership associated with it. Finally, we consider a possible objection arising from the experience of unworded inner speech, and we show how our account should inform the debate about cognitive phenomenology.

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feature of human and infrahuman mentation" (1988, p. 37). Yet, unless further arguments for the universality of systematicity are provided, the statement can be read simply as claiming that it is an important phenomenon that needs explanation, and practically everybody agrees that much. This leaves open the issue whether there are cognitive domains or processes that are not systematic in the way intended by SA, and one may conjecture, as many connectionist authors do, that some non-classicist model could just account for them.Still, the fact that some cognitive processes were not systematic in the way intended by SA would not be enough for non-classical models to carry the day. To this end they not only must show that their models are capable to deal with such cognitive processes but that they are in a better position than their classical competitors to do so.In other words, what they would need is something like a SA for themselves -let me call it the Non-classical Systematicity Argument-that would run roughly as follows:Empirical claim: X is a pervasive property of cognition (ii') Explanatory claim: the only plausible explanation for X is property Y (iii') Definitional claim: Y is a defining property of such and such nonclassical systems (iv') Dilemma: if classicism cannot account for property Y then it does not provide a full account of cognition (from i & ii); if classicism can account for Y then it is actually implementing a non-classical system (from ii & iii)My aim in this paper is to provide a path to construct such an argument. I want to stress that my main focus is not NSA itself, but the elements that may allow us to get at NSA.First, I offer an overlook of the connectionist answers to SA, classified as focusing on (i), (ii) or (iii), followed by a quick assessment of the debate. This assessment is negative for the connectionist side, in the sense that it never managed to substantiate an alternative explanation of the phenomenon pointed out by Fodor and Pylyshyn. Of course, I lack the space to go into details, so connectionist fans of this or that particular reply may think that I am being unfair to it. Yet, apart from the general considerations that I will provide to back my negative assessment, it seems to me that it is reinforced by the sheer fact that there is no agreement with respect to which reply to SA works best. My aim in this section, thus, is just to motivate the view that classical models still stand as the most plausible explanation for classical systematicity. Second, I will deal with the question whether systematicity is actually a general property of cognition. I will argue that the best chances to support such a view come from regarding Evans's well-known Generality Constraint as a constraint on the architecture of conceptual creatures -a constraint that only concepts that exhibit classical systematicity seem to satisfy. Then I will show a different way of understanding the constraint, in terms of attributions of belief, that opens the door to architectures with concepts that do not e...