The paper argues that kinship ties and sharing information on violent acts can be interpreted as forms of 'hostage-taking' likely to increase cooperation among cooffenders. The paper tests this hypothesis among members of two criminal groups, a Camorra clan based just outside Naples, and a Russian Mafia group that moved to Rome in the mid-1990s. The data consist of the transcripts of phone intercepts conducted on both groups by the Italian police over several months. After turning the data into a series of network matrices, we use Multivariate Quadratic Assignment Procedure to test the hypothesis. We conclude that the likelihood of cooperation is higher among members who have shared information about violent acts. Violence has a stronger effect than kinship in predicting tie formation and thus cooperation. When non-kinship-based mechanisms fostering cooperation exist, criminal groups are likely to resort to them.

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What are the conditions conducive to long-term transplantation of mafia groups in new territories? This article systematically reviews a number of factors that facilitate such an outcome and then explores two attempts at transplantation by members of the Calabria-based mafia group`Ndrangheta to the town of Bardonecchia (Piedmont region) and to Verona (Veneto region). While the former case was successful, the latter failed. The article concludes that features of the local economyFthe presence of significant sectors of the economy unprotected by the state and a local rather than export orientation Fgenerate a demand for criminal protection, and successful transplantation occurs in the presence of such a demand. Generalized migration or forced resettlement of mafiosi are not sufficient to predict transplantation. The article shows that a high level of interpersonal trust among local law-abiding residents is not sufficient to hinder mafia transplantation, contrary to established theories of social capital and trust.

This paper focuses on governance-type organised crime (OC). Firstly, it explores two cases of illegal governance in Salford (Greater Manchester) and Derbyshire by relying on a wide range of qualitative data. Next, it presents a novel instrument measuring the strength of governance-type OC, the 'Illegal Governance (i-Gov) Index'. This instrument is then included in a survey we conducted with Derbyshire Constabulary. This is the first systematic attempt to measure such crime in the UK. The paper shows that the governance dimension of OC is present in the UK, although with varying degrees of sophistication and development. While comparatively rare, this form of OC is pernicious and highly destructive of communities. This paper therefore calls for a systematic evaluation of such phenomenon across the UK, based on the i-Gov Index.

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It is difficult to discuss a phenomenon when one does not know precisely what it is. This problem is particularly vexing in the case of the Mafia. It has been argued that ‘the need for a definition [of the Mafia] is crucial; not just for any definition with some degree of contingent empirical plausibility, but for a definition with some analytical clout’. The word ‘Mafia’ itself has travelled far to distant lands, such as the former Soviet Union. For instance, according to Arkadii Vaksberg, Russian journalist and author of The Russian Mafia, the Mafia is ‘the entire soviet power-system, all its ideological, political, economical and administrative manifestations’. In an article published in a magazine for British executives dealing with Russia, the label Mafiosi is used to lump together bureaucrats, smugglers from the Caucasus, the cpsunomenklatura accused of embezzling state funds, the late British businessman Robert Maxwell and many others.

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This article explores the mechanisms that underpin human smuggling and trafficking. It argues for the continued analytical relevance of the distinction between "trafficking" and "smuggling", as posited by the 2000 UN Protocols. While this distinction has come under sustained criticism from several authors over the last 15 years, it nonetheless continues to capture the essential features of two distinct phenomena (control over a human being vs. illegal entry into a country), and acknowledges the role of agency in smuggling. The paper goes on to discuss three different scenarios that may emerge as a result of the interplay between smugglers and smuggled persons, and it specifies the role of exploitation in each scenario. In addition, the paper offers empirical evidence of the key building blocks of smugglingnamely the search for reliable information and the reaching of an agreement in regard to the service offeredand of how smuggling can turn into trafficking. This work concludes by drawing out the relevant policy implications.