No abstract

It has been a challenge for financial economists to explain some stylized facts observed in securities markets, among them, high levels of trading volume. The most prominent explanation of excess volume is overconfidence. High market returns make investors overconfident and as a consequence, these investors trade more subsequently and make some transactions more aggressively. The aim of our paper is to study the impact of the phenomenon of overconfidence on the trading volume and its role in the formation of the excess volume on the Tunisian stock market. Based on the work of Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) and by using VAR models and impulse response functions, we find a little evidence of the overconfidence hypothesis when we use volume (shares traded) as proxy of trading volume.

We measure cost and revenue efficiency of the Islamic and conventional Malaysian banks by using the stochastic frontier method and the meta-frontier analysis (MFA) over the period [2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012]. The use of MFA allows for the correction of the efficiency measurement errors caused by the technological and operational gap. The specific as well as the common frontiers obtained by the stochastic frontier method show the superiority of Islamic banks (IBs) compared to conventional banks (CBs) in terms of cost and revenue efficiency. This can reflect their high managerial capability. Efficiency measurement using MFA partially revealed different results. CBs have higher annual averages of cost efficiency scores than those of IBs over the period 2006-2011. The observed evolutionary trends of these averages contradict those of the capital base. This change in results is explained according to Johnes et al. (2013) by the modus operandi of IBs which seems in average less efficient than that of CBs. As for revenue efficiency, IBs are more efficient than CBs over the entire study period even though the evolution of the technological gap ratio confirms the inefficiency of their modus operandi. These results may be useful to political decision-makers and regulatory authorities.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of the degree of control of large shareholders on the relation between dividend payout and fi rm value creation. From the perspective of agency theory, dividend payout is highly appreciated for fi rms subject to highly agency problems. Using a sample of 275 fi rm-years listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period 1998 -2007, our results show that contrary to agency theory predictions, dividend payout of Tunisian fi rms contributes more to value creation when the fi rm has low agency confl icts. We fi nd a positive and highly coeffi cient for the payouts of fi rms with shared control and with majority fi nancial institution control. These results may be interpreted through the trust assigned by Tunisian investors to fi rms that have low agency problems. Our results also indicate a strong positive relationship between the return on assets, the level of debt and fi rm value. Finally, we document a negative relationship between the fi nancial business sector and fi rm value.

No abstract

This paper examines the impact of mandatory adoption of international accounting standards on the income smoothing and earning management. Using a simple of French firms indexed in the CAC all tradable for a period of ten years (2000-2009), we find convincing evidence that the implantation of IFRS contributed to less income smoothing and earning management compared to the local accounting standards, even during the recent economic crisis. Less earning manipulation assures higher levels of reliability information.

This paper examines the possible association between the voting power of large shareholders and dividend payout policy for a panel of Tunisian firms over the period 1998-2004. The results show a negative relationship between the control stake of the dominant shareholder and payout rates. In contrast, the presence of another large shareholder affects the payout ratio positively. Our results also indicate that different owner types in control influence dividend policy differently. In particular, the control stake of families is associated with a significant negative impact on the dividend distributed whereas the voting power of financial institutions has a positive effect. We conclude that different owner classes have different role in corporate governance.

Is investment cash flow sensitivity an adequate measure of a firm’s financial constraints? The answer to this
question is an unresolved puzzle. This paper theoretically and empirically examines investment cash flow
sensitivity and its ability to measure a firm's financial constraints. The empirical study focuses on an unbalanced
panel of 88 Tunisian firms observed over the 1997 to 2007 period.