The economic determinants of CEO stock option compensation

Determinants Of Stock Option Use By Chinese Companies

“…In line with theory, many empirical studies document a negative relation between equity-based compensation and block shareholdings (e.g. Chourou et al, 2008;Ittner et al, 2003;Liljeblom et al, 2011;Mehran, 1995;Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). …”

“…As a result, John and John (1993) predicts that in order to mitigate agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders, stock-based awards should be negatively related to firms' financial leverage. Empirically, Bryan et al (2000), Chourou et al (2008), Ittner et al (2003), Kato et al (2005), Ryan and Wiggins (2001) and Uchida (2006) report a negative association between stock options and leverage. In contrast, Choe (2003) develops a model in which stock option awards increase in leverage.…”

“…Consistent with the MPA, Alves (2011) and Uchida (2006) find a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the attribution of stock options. Interestingly, the results of Chourou et al (2008) show a negative sign when stock option incentive intensity is used as the dependent variable but a positive sign when tock option mix is used as the dependent variable.…”

“…Among the state-controlled firms that have completed the share-trading reform, it is expected about 50-60% meet the requirement of the State-owned Assets Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that large firms have more complex assets and more difficult to monitor, suggesting more incentives for large firms. Alves, (2011), Chourou et al (2008), Core and Guay (1999) and Gaver and Gaver (1993;, among others, document a positive relationship between stock option incentives and firm size. On the contrary, Ryan and Wiggins (2001) infer that firm size may negatively affect stock option usage because large firms receive more analysts' coverage and thus have less information asymmetry and lower monitoring costs.…”

Fatores determinantes para adoção de planos de opções de ações em companhias abertas brasileiras

“…Como exemplos, podem ser citados os estudos de Nunes (2008), , Perobelli et al (2012), Miranda, Tomé e Gallon (2011), Niyama, Campos, Gonçalves e Campos (2012), Tannuri, Farias, Vicente, Bellen e Alberton (2012) e Larini, Schäfer, Rosa e Ferreira (2015). Na literatura, dentre os fatores determinantes para a adoção de opções de ações, destacam-se o tamanho da empresa (Ding & Sun, 2001;Kato, Lemmon, Luo & Schallheim, 2005;Uchida, 2006;Chourou, Abaoub & Saadi, 2008;Tzioumis, 2008;Dias, 2010); restrições de liquidez (Yermack, 1995;Bryan et al, 2000;Ding & Sun, 2001;Uchida, 2006;Tzioumis, 2008;Dias, 2010); concentração acionária (Nagaoka, 2005;Banghoj, Gabrielsen, Petersen & Plenborg, 2010;Dias, 2010); problema de horizonte (Bryan et al, 2000;Tzioumis, 2008); dualidade do cargo de CEO e presidente do conselho de administração (TZIOU-MIS, 2008;QIN, 2012); e participação acionária do CEO (Kato et al, 2005;Uchida, 2006;Chourou et al, 2008;Tzioumis, 2008;Qin, 2012).…”