When nations are violently threatened, the choices that they make in order to cope with the challenge of war reflect different alternative possible reactions. They may choose to fiercely fight their battles; they may prefer to surrender, and sometimes the options lay in-between. One puzzle is, therefore, what makes nations fight, and more importantly-what causes them eventually to win or to lose the war. In search for an answer, this study inquires through secondary sources three historical case studies from World War II: Britain, France and Germany, and reviews how each of these major European powers acted throughout the war. After each historical description, the study examines the part that national ethos played in the manner in which each state handled war in moments of crisis. The national ethos of a people is the creed formed from the shared values and traditions through which the nation views its past, present and future; it is the integrating element that defines a nation's identity and bonds it into a coherent social group. The study reveals how national ethos is intertwined with another phenomenon of social psychology that turns it into a crucial factor in the management of international campaigns: war enthusiasm. Since national ethos is so crucial for the results of the war that a country might lead in order to survive or prosper, it is imperative for decision makers to bear in mind that it is also subject to a process of shaping and reshaping, as the Soviets have proved in relation to their Russian national ethos during World War II. A word of caution, however, is noteworthy: a wide historical perspective shows that even though the right kind of national ethos is essential for winning a war it is far from being enough. Hence national ethos proves, at the end of the day, to be a necessary condition for military victory but certainly not a sufficient one.

This study examines collective action by men and women in operational military units deployed on Israel's borders. Gender integration is generally perceived by soldiers and commanders in these units as a trivial matter rather than an issue for discussion or a disadvantage. The integration results from organizational qualities, which include military leadership with accumulated experience in gender integration; division of labour between men and women that gradually develops during protracted training; screening processes within the units; and professional development of commanders. Our findings negate a large corpus of sociological literature on gender integration in military organizations. We discuss the micro‐social processes that enable or deter mixed‐gender integration in operational units. Our findings are presented as an alternative to arguments on the inevitable marginality of women in the military and that equality is neither a prerequisite of a cohesive mixed‐gender unit nor a barrier for the inclusion of women into combat units.

As opposed to blind patriotism, a moderate form of constructive patriotism has been depicted in previous research and empirically observed. The major distinction between blind patriotism and constructive patriotism lies in the latter's capacity for criticism. Our research suggests, however, an additional distinction dividing constructive patriotism into two forms: one form is capable of practical judgment (hence, political constructive patriotism), and the other form is critical on grounds of ethical issues (hence moral constructive patriotism). This study then seeks to examine which sort of patriotism prevails within society during wartime; of special interest, for that matter, are the suggested variations of constructive patriotism. Two diverse cases have been chosen in order to examine the reactions within a democratic society: The American case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the Israeli case of the 2006 war in Lebanon. A substantive content analysis has been employed, surveying social processes through a variety of articles in an American and an Israeli daily newspaper. The findings reveal that in both cases among expressions of constructive patriotism, those of political constructive patriotism form a vast majority and only a few of them express moral constructive patriotism. It therefore seems that constructive patriots are not necessarily as moral as they might seem to be at first glance, even though they criticize state and society. The case of war in particular proves how on moral grounds criticism is important, but not enough.

Focusing on one historic but unsuccessful effort to achieve peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 2000 Camp David summit, this paper presents a systematic framework for future analyses of the conflict. An analysis of the failure of the Camp David summit enables us to spotlight some of the deepseated essential problems of war and peace in the Middle East. An inquiry into the substance of the summit reveals how, all in all, the conflict is based on six major issues: (1) the establishment of a Palestinian state, (2) the location of land for the Palestinian state, (3) the evacuation of Israeli settlements, (4) the partition of Jerusalem, (5) Palestinian custodianship over the Temple Mount, and (6) the refugee problem. Emphasizing the importance of national ethos, this paper defines the above mentioned six major issues in dispute that constitute the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by viewing them through the eyes of each of the rival parties. This article explains the causes of the conflict, relying on national forms of ethos that are rooted in narratives and collective identity. By establishing a profound comprehension of each of the six topics, this paper also creates the platform for possible future analyses of the conflict.

When nations are threatened with violence, the choices they make in order to cope with the challenges of war reflect different alternative possible reactions. They may choose to fight their battles fiercely or they may prefer to surrender and, sometimes, the options lay in-between. The question, therefore, is what makes nations fight and, more importantly, what causes them eventually to win or lose a war. In search of an answer to this riddle, this study examines secondary sources about three historical case studies taken from the first half of the twentieth century that deal with the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Soviet Union. It concentrates on the part played by national ethos regarding the manner in which each of them handled their wars in moments of crisis and reveals how national ethos is intertwined with another phenomenon of social psychology that turns it into a crucial factor in the management of international campaigns: enthusiasm for war. A wide historical perspective, however, shows that even though the right kind of national ethos is essential for winning a war, it is far from being enough. Hence national ethos proves, at the end of the day, to be a necessary condition for military victory, but certainly not a sufficient one.