Abstract. On-Line Authenticated Encryption (OAE) combines privacy with data integrity and is on-line computable. Most block cipher-based schemes for Authenticated Encryption can be run on-line and are provably secure against nonce-respecting adversaries. But they fail badly for more general adversaries. This is not a theoretical observation only -in practice, the reuse of nonces is a frequent issue 1 .In recent years, cryptographers developed misuse-resistant schemes for Authenticated Encryption. These guarantee excellent security even against general adversaries which are allowed to reuse nonces. Their disadvantage is that encryption can be performed in an off-line way, only.This paper considers OAE schemes dealing both with nonce-respecting and with general adversaries. It introduces McOE, an efficient design for OAE schemes. For this we present in detail one of the family members, McOE-X, which is a design solely based on a standard block cipher. As all the other member of the McOE family, it provably guarantees reasonable security against general adversaries as well as standard security against nonce-respecting adversaries.
We present new techniques for deriving preimage resistance bounds for block cipher based double-block-length, double-call hash functions. We give improved bounds on the preimage security of the three "classical" double-block-length, double-call, block cipher-based compression functions, these being Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM and Hirose's scheme. For Hirose's scheme, we show that an adversary must make at least 2 2n−5 block cipher queries to achieve chance 0.5 of inverting a randomly chosen point in the range. For Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM we show that at least 2 2n−10 queries are necessary. These bounds improve upon the previous best bounds of Ω(2 n) queries, and are optimal up to a constant factor since the compression functions in question have range of size 2 2n .
We provide the first proof of security for Tandem-DM, one of the oldest and most well-known constructions for turning a block cipher with n-bit block length and 2n-bit key length into a 2n-bit cryptographic hash function. We prove, that when Tandem-DM is instantiated with AES-256, block length 128 bits and key length 256 bits, any adversary that asks less than 2 120.4 queries cannot find a collision with success probability greater than 1/2. We also prove a bound for preimage resistance of Tandem-DM. Interestingly, as there is only one practical construction known turning such an (n, 2n) bit block cipher into a 2n-bit compression function that has provably birthday-type collision resistance (FSE'06, Hirose), Tandem-DM is one out of two constructions that has this desirable feature.
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