New Boomerang Attacks on ARIA

Fleischmann, Ewan; Forler, Christian; Gorski, Michael; Lucks, Stefan

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17401-8_13

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The capacity of the five-round differential-linear characteristic is 2 -45. 9 . The number of pairs required is about 2 99.4 .…”

Section: Differential-linear Attacks On Round-reduced Ariamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The design of ARIA is provably resistant against differential and linear attacks, but many other cryptanalysis methods have been developed to attack ARIA, such as integral attacks [7], [8], boomerang attacks [9], meet-in-the-middle attacks [10]- [12], impossible differential attacks [13]- [15], zero-correlation linear attacks [16], and biclique attacks [17]. Li and others [7] presented integral attacks based on six-round ARIA-128 and seven-round ARIA-256.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Li and others [7] presented integral attacks based on six-round ARIA-128 and seven-round ARIA-256. Fleischmann and others [9] reported boomerang attacks based on six rounds of ARIA-128 and seven rounds of ARIA-256 using all the plaintexts. Wu and others [13] presented a six-round impossible differential attack against ARIA, which was improved with lower attack complexities by Li and others [14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Yi¹,

Ren²,

Chen³

2017

ETRI J

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ARIA is a 128‐bit block cipher that has been selected as a Korean encryption standard. Similar to AES, it is robust against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this study, we analyze the security of ARIA against differential‐linear cryptanalysis. We present five rounds of differential‐linear distinguishers for ARIA, which can distinguish five rounds of ARIA from random permutations using only 284.8 chosen plaintexts. Moreover, we develop differential‐linear attacks based on six rounds of ARIA‐128 and seven rounds of ARIA‐256. This is the first multidimensional differential‐linear cryptanalysis of ARIA and it has lower data complexity than all previous results. This is a preliminary study and further research may obtain better results in the future.

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“…The capacity of the five-round differential-linear characteristic is 2 -45. 9 . The number of pairs required is about 2 99.4 .…”

Section: Differential-linear Attacks On Round-reduced Ariamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Yi¹,

Ren²,

Chen³

2017

ETRI J

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“…In [3], Wu et al first found some non-trivial 4-round impossible differentials which led to a 6-round attack on ARIA. The security of ARIA against boomerang attack was presented by Fleischmann et al [4]. Li et al first found some 3-round integral distinguishers by counting methods, which also led to a 6-round integral attack on ARIA-192 [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biclique key recovery for ARIA‐256

Chen

2014

IET Information Security

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“…(4) For current 0, (1,11) , guess 0, (4,14) and partially encrypt plaintext pairs in (1) , and then select plaintext pairs whose difference (4,14) satisfies the equation (17). We store 2 +119 × 2 −8 = 2 +111 remaining ( (4,14) , SL 1, (4,14) ) and its SN in table (2) indexed by 0, (4,14) .…”

Section: The Procedures Of 7-round Attack Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple Impossible Differentials Cryptanalysis on 7-Round ARIA-192

Jiang

Jin

2018

Security and Communication Networks

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This paper studies the security of 7-round ARIA-192 against multiple impossible differentials cryptanalysis. We propose six special 4-round impossible differentials which have the same input difference and different output difference with the maximum number of nonzero common bytes. Based on these differentials, we construct six attack trails including the maximum number of common subkey bytes. Under such circumstances, we utilize an efficient sieving process to improve the efficiency of eliminating common subkeys; therefore, both data and time complexities are reduced. Furthermore, we also present an efficient algorithm to recover the master key via guess-and-determine technique. Taking advantage of the above advances, we have obtained the best result so far for impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA-192, with time, data, and memory complexities being 2 189.8 7-round ARIA encryptions, 2 116.6 chosen plaintexts, and 2 139.3 bytes, respectively.

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New Boomerang Attacks on ARIA

Cited by 10 publications

References 9 publications

Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Biclique key recovery for ARIA‐256

Multiple Impossible Differentials Cryptanalysis on 7-Round ARIA-192

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