In this paper, we review the literature on private benefits and cross-listings in the United States. We first discuss the alternative approaches used to measure private benefits. We then survey recent evidence documenting crosscountry differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated with high and low private benefits. We also then explain how, by cross-listing its stock in a market with high disclosure and regulatory standards such as the United States, a firm can commit to a relatively low level of private benefits in the future. We discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical implications of this bonding view of cross-listings. Overall, the evidence provides a compelling case that the desire to protect shareholders' rights so as to facilitate access to equity markets is one of a number of reasons why firms choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States. D

We apply economic principles to understand how distributed ledger technology (DLT) might impact the innovation process and eventual market structure in the security settlement industry. Our main conclusions are that:  i) Although DLT has the potential to significantly reduce costs in securities settlement, implementation is challenging, ii) technological innovation in the post-trade industry is more likely to succeed with some degree of coordination, which could be facilitated by the relevant authorities, and iii) DLTbased securities settlement is likely to be concentrated among few providers which, absent any regulation, could result in inefficient monopoly pricing or efficient price discrimination with service providers capturing much of the market surplus

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We quantify the price discovery contribution of high-frequency traders (HFTs) in the United Kingdom equity market and examine how it varies in their cross-section. For this, we group individual HFTs according to their liquidity taking/making activity. HFTs contribute about 14% of all trade-induced information, with aggressive HFTs accounting for two-thirds of this contribution. This suggests that HFTs who pursue strategies that require use of aggressive trades are the most informed, as opposed to passive HFTs who more likely act as market makers. However, information shares decline with the amount of aggressive volume, suggesting that HFTs' news trading strategies are not scalable.

We use proprietary transaction data on interest rate swaps to assess the effects of centralized trading, as mandated by Dodd–Frank, on market quality. Contracts with the most extensive centralized trading see liquidity metrics improve by between 12% and 19% relative to those of a control group. This is driven by a clear increase in competition between dealers, particularly in U.S. markets. Additionally, centralized trading has caused interdealer trading in EUR swap markets to migrate from the United States to Europe. This is consistent with swap dealers attempting to avoid being captured by the trade mandate in order to maintain market power.