In this article, we review decades of research on state repression and nonviolent resistance. We argue that these two research programs have converged around six consensus findings. We also highlight several areas of divergence, where greater synthesis between the research on state repression and nonviolent resistance might prove useful. We draw attention to remaining controversies surrounding the association between state repression and nonviolent resistance-particularly regarding different theoretical assumptions about structure, agency, and strategic choice; measurement challenges for both repression and dissent; methodological challenges regarding endogeneity, multicausality, and equifinality; and moral hazards associated with the study of nonviolent resistance and the effectiveness of repression. We conclude by highlighting some productive ways forward.
Armed groups are prone to instability and fragmentation, but what explains variation among the new groups that emerge? I argue that the internal politics preceding organizational splits is critical. When it comes to the survival of breakaway groups, those forming around single issue areas gain an advantage by attracting more homogeneous, preference-aligned recruits. On the other hand, those forming over a variety of grievances attract a more heterogeneous population whose divergent views undermine cohesion and cooperation, necessitate hierarchy, and diminish the odds of organizational survival. I test this argument with a case study of two Republican groups from Northern Ireland—the Real Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army. The findings confirm my argument and underscore the limited utility of studying organizational fractures from the sole perspective of contemporaneous external events like conciliation and repression. Rather, I show how internal political dynamics influence the composition, identity, and overall trajectory of breakaway groups. This has implications for designing effective counterinsurgent policies, for understanding the formation of armed groups, and for anticipating whether breakaway groups are likely to escalate, moderate, or adopt spoiling behavior.
This chapter evaluates the book’s theory quantitatively. It begins by describing a new data set detailing the causes of organizational splits among 300 randomly-selected armed groups between 1970 and 2014. This offers some of the first insight into the different causes of organizational splits and their relative frequency over time. Then, using this new data, the chapter presents statistical analyses of the radicalization and survival of armed groups. It examines how splinters behave in their first recorded year of activity, just after they break away, and throughout their entire existence. Across both periods, the findings support the book’s theoretical expectations. Splinter groups motivated by strategy are highly radicalized and conduct particularly lethal attacks, whereas those forming unidimensionally around single issues are especially durable.
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