Statistically Evaluating How Splinter Groups Emerge and Behave

Abstract

This chapter evaluates the book’s theory quantitatively. It begins by describing a new data set detailing the causes of organizational splits among 300 randomly-selected armed groups between 1970 and 2014. This offers some of the first insight into the different causes of organizational splits and their relative frequency over time. Then, using this new data, the chapter presents statistical analyses of the radicalization and survival of armed groups. It examines how splinters behave in their first recorded year of activity, just after they break away, and throughout their entire existence. Across both periods, the findings support the book’s theoretical expectations. Splinter groups motivated by strategy are highly radicalized and conduct particularly lethal attacks, whereas those forming unidimensionally around single issues are especially durable.

Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence

“…By showcasing important differences among splinter and parent organizations, this paper reinforces the need for more research on organizational traits and their impact on conflict dynamics. Additionally, our findings advance a growing body of research on the consequences of fragmentation and splintering (e.g., Bakke et al 2012;Cunningham 2013;Cunningham et al 2012;Christia 2012;Perkoski 2022). We show that the selection into splintering drives certain types of splinter groups to emerge more frequently than others, a process that impacts the strength and nature of veto players in ongoing civil wars.…”

“…Armed groups often experience discord and internal conflict (Christia 2012;Morrison 2017). This conflict is typically driven by disagreements between group members over the organization's strategy, tactics, or internal distribution of power (Asal et al 2012;Doctor 2020;Perkoski 2019Perkoski , 2022Otto 2018;Tamm 2016). Motivated to challenge these policies, group members with shared beliefs may organize internally as factions (Perkoski 2019(Perkoski , 2022.…”

“…This conflict is typically driven by disagreements between group members over the organization's strategy, tactics, or internal distribution of power (Asal et al 2012;Doctor 2020;Perkoski 2019Perkoski , 2022Otto 2018;Tamm 2016). Motivated to challenge these policies, group members with shared beliefs may organize internally as factions (Perkoski 2019(Perkoski , 2022. Under certain conditions, a faction may splinter from the parent organization to form a new group that is more closely aligned with the faction's preferences (Morrison 2017).…”

“…When internal disagreements arise between a faction of group members and the group leader, the faction chooses from at least three courses of potential action: (1) do nothing and remain subservient to the current leader; (2) co-opt the leader and potentially take control of the organization; and (3) leave the organization and establish a new splinter group (Christia 2012;Hirschman 1970;Perkoski 2019Perkoski , 2022Woldemariam 2018). 9…”

Examining the Impact of the Obama and Trump Candidacies on Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism in the United States: A Time-Series Analysis

“…Furthermore, right-wing extremism continues to represent a clear and present danger to the safety and security of the United States (Berger, 2016b; Gardell, 2003; McCooey, 2012; SPLC, 2020). Despite this persistent threat, the emergence of organizational fragmentation, movement diversification, and lone-wolf terrorism has made the study of right-wing extremism increasingly difficult (Perkoski, 2015; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015).…”