The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that insurers spend a minimum amount of their premium revenue on policyholder benefits. The Act specifies enforcement via a combination of insurer self-reporting, government examinations, and payment of policyholder rebates in cases where insurers fail to meet the required spending amount. We find that insurers' reported estimates are consistently overstated in situations where more accurate estimates would have triggered rebate payments; publicly-traded insurers (particularly those exhibiting poor financial reporting quality) exhibit the strongest evidence of strategic over-estimating. In aggregate, we estimate that approximately 14 percent of insurers engage in strategic overestimates, and that insurer overestimates resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in underpaid policyholder rebates. Our study illustrates how a combination of regulatory design choices and lax oversight can weaken the effectiveness of accounting-based regulation and have substantial economic consequences.
Prior literature on Enterprise Risk Management's (ERM) value implications focuses on cost–benefit analyses of implementing an ERM program. We take a novel approach by examining the implementation dynamics and study whether the timing of firms' adoption affects ERM's value implication. We find that firms experienced positive (negative) abnormal returns when adopting ERM following (before) 2005 when Standard & Poor's (S&P) issued their ERM‐related rating criteria. We also find evidence that ERM firms experienced positive abnormal market reactions to this rating criteria change by S&P but find no evidence for the following change by A.M. Best. In addition, our study documents that the market rewarded ERM adopters and penalized nonadopters after November 2011 on key dates leading to the passage of the Own Risk Solvency Assessment (ORSA) Act when there was less uncertainty regarding ultimate passage of the Act. Overall, our results imply that the capital market's view on ERM is shaped by rating agency and regulatory changes. Our findings are also consistent with the view that investors gain a greater understanding of ERM over time.
Loss reserves are a discretionary tool for managing insurer earnings, with more accurate and/or less volatile reserve errors resulting in higher accruals quality. We investigate whether accruals quality is related to insurer financial strength ratings. Specifically, we use insurer loss reserve errors as a measure of the quality of accruals and examine whether overall accruals quality, as well as a decomposition into innate and discretionary accruals quality, is related to insurer financial strength ratings. We find that firms with lowerquality (noisier) accruals receive lower financial strength ratings from A.M. Best. This result holds for both innate and discretionary accruals. Overall, we provide the first evidence that the quality of accounting information is a significant factor in ratings of insurance firms.
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