We examine the information value contained in insurer rating changes. Using a contemporary event study approach, we document an asymmetric reaction of stock prices to rating changes: downgrades cut share prices by approximately 7 percent but upgrades have little significant effect. This result varies across agencies as share prices react more strongly to A.M. Best and Standard & Poor's downgrades than to Moody's. We observe a similar asymmetric reaction to rating changes subject to a common rating benchmark. Finally, we find that prices fall most dramatically when a rating downgrade from one rating agency follows a downgrade from another agency.
Unlike studies that estímate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms' eamings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock awards tend to make reserving decisions that serve to decrease firm earnings. Moreover, we examine the monitoring effect of corporate board structures in mitigating managers' reserve manipulation practices. We find managers are more likely to manipula te reserves in the presence of particular board structures. Similar results are not found when we employ traditional estimated measures of managerial bias.
a b s t r a c tWe test the hypothesis that practicing enterprise risk management (ERM) reduces firms' cost of reducing risk. Adoption of ERM represents a radical paradigm shift from the traditional method of managing risks individually to managing risks collectively allowing ERM-adopting firms to better recognize natural hedges, prioritize hedging activities towards the risks that contribute most to the total risk of the firm, and optimize the evaluation and selection of available hedging instruments. We hypothesize that these advantages allow ERM-adopting firms to produce greater risk reduction per dollar spent. Our hypothesis further predicts that, after implementing ERM, firms experience profit maximizing incentives to lower risk. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms adopting ERM experience a reduction in stock return volatility. We also find that the reduction in return volatility for ERM-adopting firms becomes stronger over time. Further, we find that operating profits per unit of risk (ROA/return volatility) increase post ERM adoption.
This article applies a unique accruals measure to empirically test whether accruals quality affects the cost of capital for property–liability insurers. We utilize insurer loss reserve errors to accurately measure the quality of accruals. This measure, as well as conventional accruals measures, is used to investigate the extent to which accruals quality is priced into both debt and equity capital. We find that accruals quality is priced into debt capital; however, we find virtually no evidence that accruals quality is priced into equity capital. Our results should be of particular interest to insurers as it affects pricing ability. Specifically, insurers who provide primary debtholders (i.e., policyholders) less information risk are able to command higher prices. Furthermore, our results suggest that insurance is not a diversifiable asset.
We exploit the transparency of internal capital markets (ICMs) within insurance groups to investigate the activity and efficiency of ICMs within insurance groups. Specifically, we compare the relationship between internal capital transfers and investment to that between capital from other sources and investment. The ability to track the actual ICM transactions allows for more direct analysis of ICM activity than most previous studies. Consistent with theory, we find evidence that ICMs play a significant role in the investment behavior of affiliated insurers. We then use these detailed data to execute a more direct test of ICM efficiency than currently exists in the literature. Consistent with ICM efficiency, results suggest that capital is allocated to subsidiaries with the best expected performance. Copyright (c) The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2008.
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