Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We quantify the importance of trade credit chains for the propagation of corporate bankruptcies. Our results show that trade creditors (suppliers) that issue more trade credit are more exposed to trade debtor (customer) failures, both in terms of the likelihood of experiencing a debtor failure and the loss given failure. We further document that the credit loss invoked by a debtor failure imposes a substantially enhanced bankruptcy risk on the creditors. The propagation mechanism is mitigated for creditors that are less levered, cash rich, and highly pro…table, and enhanced in R&D intense industries and during economic downturns. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: Trade credit; Credit chains; Bankruptcy; Contagion JEL: G30; G33 Discussions with and suggestions from Roc Armenter, Mikael Carlsson, Satyajit Chatterjee, Hans Degryse, Reint Gropp, Thomas Jansson, Nobu Kiyotaki, Judit Montoriol-Garriga, Leonard Nakamura, Steven Ongena, Fabiana Penas, Gregory Udell and Jason Wei have been very helpful in improving upon earlier drafts. We are also grateful for comments from seminar participants at Sveriges Riksbank. We are indebted to Tommy von Brömsen for providing outstanding research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as re ‡ecting the views of the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank.y Research Division, Sveriges Riksbank.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. The papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments. Abstract We demonstrate improvements in predictive power when introducing spline functions to take account of highly non-linear relationships between …rm failure and earnings, leverage, and liquidity in a logistic bankruptcy model. Our results show that modeling excessive non-linearities yields substantially improved bankruptcy predictions, on the order of 70 to 90 percent, compared with a standard logistic model. The spline model provides several important and surprising insights into non-monotonic bankruptcy relationships. We …nd that low-leveraged and highly pro…table …rms are riskier than given by a standard model. These features are remarkably stable over time, suggesting that they are of a structural nature. Terms of use: Documents in

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We quantify the importance of trade credit chains for the propagation of corporate bankruptcies. Our results show that trade creditors (suppliers) that issue more trade credit are more exposed to trade debtor (customer) failures, both in terms of the likelihood of experiencing a debtor failure and the loss given failure. We further document that the credit loss invoked by a debtor failure imposes a substantially enhanced bankruptcy risk on the creditors. The propagation mechanism is mitigated for creditors that are less levered, cash rich, and highly pro…table, and enhanced in R&D intense industries and during economic downturns. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: Trade credit; Credit chains; Bankruptcy; Contagion JEL: G30; G33 Discussions with and suggestions from Roc Armenter, Mikael Carlsson, Satyajit Chatterjee, Hans Degryse, Reint Gropp, Thomas Jansson, Nobu Kiyotaki, Judit Montoriol-Garriga, Leonard Nakamura, Steven Ongena, Fabiana Penas, Gregory Udell and Jason Wei have been very helpful in improving upon earlier drafts. We are also grateful for comments from seminar participants at Sveriges Riksbank. We are indebted to Tommy von Brömsen for providing outstanding research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as re ‡ecting the views of the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank.y Research Division, Sveriges Riksbank.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We quantify the importance of trade credit chains for the propagation of corporate bankruptcies. Our results show that trade creditors (suppliers) that issue more trade credit are more exposed to trade debtor (customer) failures, both in terms of the likelihood of experiencing a debtor failure and the loss given failure. We further document that the credit loss invoked by a debtor failure imposes a substantially enhanced bankruptcy risk on the creditors. The propagation mechanism is mitigated for creditors that are less levered, cash rich, and highly pro…table, and enhanced in R&D intense industries and during economic downturns. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: Trade credit; Credit chains; Bankruptcy; Contagion JEL: G30; G33 Discussions with and suggestions from Roc Armenter, Mikael Carlsson, Satyajit Chatterjee, Hans Degryse, Reint Gropp, Thomas Jansson, Nobu Kiyotaki, Judit Montoriol-Garriga, Leonard Nakamura, Steven Ongena, Fabiana Penas, Gregory Udell and Jason Wei have been very helpful in improving upon earlier drafts. We are also grateful for comments from seminar participants at Sveriges Riksbank. We are indebted to Tommy von Brömsen for providing outstanding research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as re ‡ecting the views of the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank.y Research Division, Sveriges Riksbank.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractA string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor's willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its credit supply when a borrower obtains a loan at another creditor (an "outside loan"). Consistent with the theoretical literature, the effect is more pronounced the larger the outside loans and it is muted if the initial creditor's existing and future loans retain seniority over the outside loans and are secured with valuable collateral.JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G34, L13, L14.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractA string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor's willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its credit supply when a borrower obtains a loan at another creditor (an "outside loan"). Consistent with the theoretical literature, the effect is more pronounced the larger the outside loans and it is muted if the initial creditor's existing and future loans retain seniority over the outside loans and are secured with valuable collateral.JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G34, L13, L14.

Using data on exogenous liquidity losses generated by the fraud and failure of a cash-in-transit firm, we demonstrate a causal impact on firms' trade credit usage. We find that firms manage liquidity shortfalls by increasing the amount of drawn credit from suppliers and decreasing the amount issued to customers. The compounded trade credit adjustments are at least as great, if not greater than corresponding adjustments in cash holdings, suggesting that trade credit positions are economically important sources of reserve liquidity. The underlying mechanism in trade credit adjustments is in part due to shifts in credit durations-both upstream and downstream.

Using data on exogenous liquidity losses generated by the fraud and failure of a cash-in-transit firm, we demonstrate a causal impact on firms' trade credit usage. We find that firms manage liquidity shortfalls by increasing the amount of drawn credit from suppliers and decreasing the amount issued to customers. The compounded trade credit adjustments are at least as great, if not greater than corresponding adjustments in cash holdings, suggesting that trade credit positions are economically important sources of reserve liquidity. The underlying mechanism in trade credit adjustments is in part due to shifts in credit durations-both upstream and downstream.