What accounts for cross-national variation in religiosity as measured by church attendance and non-religious rates? Examining answers from both secularization theory and the religious economy perspective, we assert that cross-national variation in religious participation is a function of government welfare spending and provide a theory that links macro-sociological outcomes with individual rationality. Churches historically have provided social welfare. As governments gradually assume many of these welfare functions, individuals with elastic preferences for spiritual goods will reduce their level of participation since the desired welfare goods can be obtained from secular sources. Cross-national data on welfare spending and religious participation show a strong negative relationship between these two variables after controlling for other aspects of modernization.

Why do foreign aid budgets vary across countries and over time? Existing research indicates that the same set of factors shapes commitments toward both domestic and international redistribution. While scholars have acknowledged international normative influences on aid allocations, research on levels of donor generosity has not examined how international trade influences aid budgets. This paper examines whether imports from developing countries have a 'displacement effect' on aid commitments. Employing a panel of nineteen OECD donor countries, we analyze aid budgets from 1980 to 2000. We find that increased imports from developing countries to donor countries are associated with aid reductions. These results persist after controlling for international and domestic variables identified in previous research, and under other estimation techniques and model specifications.

Abstract.“Trade, not aid” has long been a catchphrase in international development discourse. This paper evaluates whether the “trade, not aid” logic has driven bilateral aid allocations in practice. Using a dataset that covers development assistance from 22 donor countries to 187 aid recipients from 1980 to 2002, we find that donor countries have dispersed bilateral aid in ways that reinforce their extant bilateral commercial ties with recipient countries. Instead of “trade, not aid,” bilateral aid disbursement has followed the logic of “aid following trade.” The policy implication is that bilateral aid allocation patterns have reinforced the disadvantages of poor countries that have a limited ability to participate in international trade due to a variety of factors such as geography and a lack of tradable resources.Résumé.«Le commerce et non l'aide» est un slogan qui continue d'occuper une place importante dans le débat sur le développement international. L'article qui suit vise à évaluer la mise en pratique de ce principe dans les allocations de l'aide bilatérale. S'appuyant sur une base de données recouvrant l'aide distribuée par 22 pays donateurs à 187 pays récipiendaires entre 1980 et 2002, notre analyse révèle que l'aide a été allouée en fonction des liens commerciaux bilatéraux existants et les a renforcés. C'est donc le principe de «l'aide après le commerce» qui a prévalu. Les allocations d'aide bilatérale ont ainsi aggravé les désavantages des pays pauvres dont la capacité à bénéficier du commerce international est limitée en raison de divers facteurs, dont la situation géographique et le manque de ressources marchandes.

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