Because bundled payments are relatively new and require a different type of collaboration among payers, providers, and other actors, their design and implementation process is complex. By sorting the 53 key elements that contribute to this complexity into specific pre‐ and postcontractual phases as well as the actors involved in the health system, this framework provides a comprehensive overview of this complexity from a payer's perspective. Strategically, the design and implementation of bundled payments should not be approached by payers as merely the introduction of a new contracting model, but as part of a broader transformation into a more sustainable, value‐based health care system. Context Traditional fee‐for‐service (FFS) payment models in health care stimulate volume‐driven care rather than value‐driven care. To address this issue, increasing numbers of payers are adopting contracts based on bundled payments. Because their design and implementation are complex, understanding the elements that contribute to this complexity from a payer's perspective might facilitate their adoption. Consequently, the objective of our study was to identify and structure the key elements in the design and implementation of bundled payment contracts. Methods Two of us independently and systematically examined the literature to identify all the elements considered relevant to our objective. We then developed a framework in which these elements were arranged according to the specific phases of a care procurement process and actors’ interactions at various levels of the health system. Findings The final study sample consisted of 147 articles in which we identified the 53 elements included in the framework. These elements were found in all phases of the pre‐ and postcontractual procurement process and involved actors at different levels of the health care system. Examples of elements that were cited frequently and are typical of bundled payment procurement, as opposed to FFS procurement, are (1) specification of care services, patients’ characteristics, and corresponding costs, (2) small and heterogeneous patient populations, (3) allocation of payment and savings/losses among providers, (4) identification of patients in the bundle, (5) alignment of the existing care delivery model with the new payment model, and (6) limited effects on quality and costs in the first pilots and demonstrations. Conclusions Compared with traditional FFS payment models, bundled payment contracts tend to introduce an alternative set of (financial) incentives, touch on almost all aspects of governance within organizations, and demand a different type of collaboration among organizations. Accordingly, payers should not strategically approach their design and implementation as merely the adoption of a new contracting model, but rather as part of a broader transformation toward a more sustainable value‐based health care system, based less on short‐term transactional negotiations and more on long‐term collaborative relationships between payers and provide...
Global budget (GB) arrangements have become a popular method worldwide to control the rise in healthcare expenditures. By guaranteeing hospital funding, payers hope to eliminate the drive for increased production, and incentivize providers to deliver more efficient care and lower utilization. We evaluated the introduction of GB contracts by certain large insurers in Dutch hospital care in 2012 and compared health care utilization to those insurers who continued with more traditional production-based contracts, i.e., cost ceiling (CC) contracts. We used the share of GB hospital funding per postal code region to study the effect of contract types. Our findings show that having higher share of GB financing was associated with lower growth in treatment intensity, but it was also associated with higher growth in the probability of having at least one hospital visit. While the former finding is in line with our expectation, the latter is not and suggests that hospital visits may take longer to respond to contract incentives. Our study covers the years of 2010-2013 (2 years before and 2 years following the introduction of the new contracts). Therefore, our results capture only short-term effects.
BackgroundThere is an increasing number of quality indicators being reported publicly with aim to improve the transparency on hospital care quality. However, they are little used by patients. Knowledge on patients’ preferences regarding quality may help to optimise the information presented to them.ObjectiveTo measure the preferences of patients with breast and colon cancers regarding publicly reported quality indicators of Dutch hospital care.MethodsFrom the existing set of clinical quality indicators, participants of patient group discussions first assessed an indicator’s suitability as choice information and then identified the most relevant ones. We used the final selection as attributes in two discrete choice experiments (DCEs). Questionnaires included choice vignettes as well as a direct ranking exercise, and were distributed among patient communities. Data were analysed using mixed logit models.ResultsBased on the patient group discussions, 6 of 52 indicators (breast cancer) and 5 of 21 indicators (colon cancer) were selected as attributes. The questionnaire was completed by 84 (breast cancer) and 145 respondents (colon cancer). In the patient group discussions and in the DCEs, respondents valued outcome indicators as most important: those reflecting tumour residual (breast cancer) and failure to rescue (colon cancer). Probability analyses revealed a larger range in percentage change of choice probabilities for breast cancer (10.9%–69.9%) relative to colon cancer (7.9%–20.9%). Subgroup analyses showed few differences in preferences across ages and educational levels. DCE findings partly matched with those of direct ranking.ConclusionStudy findings show that patients focused on a subset of indicators when making their choice of hospital and that they valued outcome indicators the most. In addition, patients with breast cancer were more responsive to quality information than patients with colon cancer.
Hospital quality indicators provide valuable insights for quality improvement, empower patients to choose providers, and have become a cornerstone of value-based payment. As outcome indicators are cumbersome and expensive to measure, many health systems have relied on proxy indicators, such as structure and process indicators. In this paper, we assess the extent to which publicly reported structure and process indicators are correlated with outcome indicators, to determine if these provide useful signals to inform the public about the outcomes. Quality indicators for three conditions (breast and colorectal cancer, and hip replacement surgery) for Dutch hospitals (2011–2018) were collected. Structure and process indicators were compared to condition-specific outcome indicators and in-hospital mortality ratios in a between-hospital comparison (cross-sectional and between-effects models) and in within-hospital comparison (fixed-effects models). Systematic association could not be observed for any of the models. Both positive and negative signs were observed where negative associations were to be expected. Despite sufficient statistical power, the share of significant correlations was small [mean share: 13.2% (cross-sectional); 26.3% (between-effects); 13.2% (fixed-effects)]. These findings persisted in stratified analyses by type of hospital and in models using a multivariate approach. We conclude that, in the context of compulsory public reporting, structure and process indicators are not correlated with outcome indicators, neither in between-hospital comparisons nor in within-hospital comparisons. While structure and process indicators remain valuable for internal quality improvement, they are unsuitable as signals for informing the public about hospital differences in health outcomes.
Zorgverzekeraars en zorgaanbieders maken meestal contractafspraken op basis van een vergoeding per verrichting. Dat stimuleert echter volume van zorg in plaats van uitkomsten. Daarom passen zorgverzekeraars en zorgaanbieders steeds vaker ‘bundelinkoop’ als bekostiging toe. Dan wordt een bedrag per patiënt afgesproken. We beschrijven wat bundelinkoop is en introduceren de contractelementen. De impact van zorgbundels is dat ze door een andere verdeling van (financiële) verantwoordelijkheden uitkomsten centraal stellen, schotten doorbreken en innovatie stimuleren. Opschalen van deze methode van zorginkoop vraagt om standaardisatie van de contractelementen en uniformiteit van de bundeldefinitie per aandoening anders nemen de administratieve lasten voor zorgaanbieders toe.
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