The role of Stroop processes in the emotional Stroop effect was subjected to a conceptual scrutiny augmented by a series of experiments entailing reading or lexical decision as well as color naming. The analysis showed that the Stroop effect is not defined in the emotional Stroop task. The experiments showed that reading, lexical decision, and color naming all are slower with emotional words and that this delay is immune to task-irrelevant variation and to changes in the relative salience of the words and the colors. The delay was absent when emotional and neutral words appeared in a single block. A threat-driven generic slowdown is implicated, not a selective attention mechanism associated with the classic Stroop effect.
Three influential perspectives of social cognition entail conflicting predictions regarding the selectivity of performance under stress. According to the attention view, selectivity to the task-relevant attribute improves under stress because of reduced utilization of task-irrelevant attributes. According to the capacity-resource approach, stress depletes attentional resources wherefore selectivity fails for all but chronically accessible information. A third perspective, ironic process theory, similarly holds that selective attention fails under stress but adds that task-irrelevant information is rendered hyperaccessible. The theoretical derivations were tested in a series of experiments using 2 classes of selectivity measures, with special care taken to control for hitherto neglected factors of context The results showed that the selectivity of attention improved under stress, consistent with the prediction of the attention view.
According to a growing consensus, the Stroop effect is understood as a phenomenon of conflict and cognitive control. A tidal wave of recent research alleges that incongruent Stroop stimuli generate conflict, which is then managed and resolved by top-down cognitive control. We argue otherwise: control studies fail to account for major Stroop results obtained over a century-long history of research. We list some of the most compelling developments and show that no control account can serve as a viable explanation for major Stroop phenomena and that there exist more parsimonious explanations for other Stroop related phenomena. Against a wealth of studies and emerging consensus, we posit that
data-driven selective attention
best accounts for the gamut of existing Stroop results. The case for data-driven attention is not new: a mere twenty-five years ago, the Stroop effect was considered “the gold standard” of
attention
(
MacLeod, 1992
). We identify four pitfalls plaguing conflict monitoring and control studies of the Stroop effect and show that the notion of top-down control is gratuitous. Looking at the Stroop effect from a historical perspective, we argue that the recent paradigm change from stimulus-driven selective attention to control is unwarranted. Applying Occam’s razor, the effects marshaled in support of the control view are better explained by a selectivity of attention account. Moreover, many Stroop results, ignored in the control literature, are inconsistent with any control account of the effect.
The current study is a follow-up on the 2002 empirical study by Eshet-Alkalai and Amichai-Hamburger, which investigated digital literacy skills among different age groups. This study explores changes through time in digital literacy among the same participants 5 years later, and their performance is compared to new matched control groups. Results indicate an improvement over time among all age groups, but especially for the adults, in the tasks that require proficiency and technical control in using technology (e.g., photovisual and branching literacy skills). On the other hand, results indicate a drop in the skills that require creative and critical thinking (e.g., information and reproduction literacy skills), especially for the younger participants. Results show two major patterns of change over time: (a) closing the gap between younger and older participants in the tasks that emphasize proficiency and technical control and (b) widening the gap between younger and older participants in tasks that emphasize creativity and critical thinking. Based on the comparison with the matched control groups, we suggest that experience with technology, and not age, accounts for the observed lifelong changes in digital literacy skills.
BackgroundHuman resolution for object size is typically determined by psychophysical methods that are based on conscious perception. In contrast, grasping of the same objects might be less conscious. It is suggested that grasping is mediated by mechanisms other than those mediating conscious perception. In this study, we compared the visual resolution for object size of the visuomotor and the perceptual system.Methodology/Principal FindingsIn Experiment 1, participants discriminated the size of pairs of objects once through perceptual judgments and once by grasping movements toward the objects. Notably, the actual size differences were set below the Just Noticeable Difference (JND). We found that grasping trajectories reflected the actual size differences between the objects regardless of the JND. This pattern was observed even in trials in which the perceptual judgments were erroneous. The results of an additional control experiment showed that these findings were not confounded by task demands. Participants were not aware, therefore, that their size discrimination via grasp was veridical.Conclusions/SignificanceWe conclude that human resolution is not fully tapped by perceptually determined thresholds. Grasping likely exhibits greater resolving power than people usually realize.
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