This paper constructs a theory of the coexistence of fixed-term and permanent employment contracts in an environment with ex-ante identical workers and employers. Workers under fixed-term contracts can be dismissed at no cost while permanent employees enjoy labor protection. In a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, firms find it optimal to discriminate by offering some workers a fixedterm contract while offering other workers a permanent contract. Match-specific quality between a worker and a firm determines the type of contract offered. We analytically characterize the firm's hiring and firing rules. Using matched employer-employee data from Canada, we estimate the model's parameters. Increasing the level of firing costs increases wage inequality and decreases the unemployment rate. The increase in inequality results from a larger fraction of temporary workers and not from an increase in the wage premium earned by permanent workers.
This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: This paper is concerned with the business cycle dynamics in search-and-matching models of the labor market when agents are ex post heterogeneous. We focus on wealth heterogeneity that comes as a result of imperfect opportunities to insure against idiosyncratic risk. We show that this heterogeneity implies wage rigidity relative to a complete insurance economy. The fraction of wealth-poor agents prevents real wages from falling too much in recessions since small decreases in income imply large losses in utility. Analogously, wages rise less in expansions compared with the standard model because small increases are enough for poor workers to accept job offers. This mechanism reduces the volatility of wages and increases the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. This channel can be relevant if the lack of insurance is large enough so that the fraction of agents close to the borrowing constraint is significant. However, discipline in the parameterization implies an earnings variance and persistence in the unemployment state that result in a large degree of self-insurance. Terms of use: Documents inJEL classification: E24, E32, J41, J63, J64
Recent studies in monetary theory show that if buyers can use lotteries to signal the quality of bank notes, counterfeiting does not occur in a pooling equilibrium. In this paper, I investigate the robustness of this non-existence result by considering an alternative trading mechanism. Specifically, a competitive search environment is employed in which sellers post offers and buyers direct their search based on those offers. In contrast to the previous studies, buyers' ability to signal is fully eliminated in this environment. However, I find that counterfeiting does not exist if the equilibrium concept proposed by Guerrieri et al. (2010) is used. This is a refinement scheme in which sellers' out-of-equilibrium beliefs about the likelihood of meeting with different types of buyers are restricted. Moreover, a threat of counterfeiting can result in the collapse of a monetary equilibrium. An extension of the model is provided which allows the threat of counterfeiting to materialize, in that some buyers cannot observe the offers, and therefore search randomly. Counterfeit notes are produced by those buyers who randomly search. JEL classification: D82, D83, E42 Bank classification: Bank notes RésuméLes récentes études en théorie monétaire ont montré que, si les indications des acheteurs sur la qualité des billets de banque sont obtenues au moyen de loteries, la contrefaçon n'existe pas en situation d'équilibre non séparateur. L'auteur fait appel ici à un autre mécanisme de négociation pour vérifier la robustesse de ce résultat. Il définit un cadre de prospection concurrentielle dans lequel les vendeurs affichent des offres qui aiguillent les acheteurs. Il est impossible à ces derniers de transmettre des signaux, hypothèse différente de celle retenue dans les travaux précédents. L'auteur conclut que, malgré cela, la contrefaçon n'existe pas en situation d'équilibre si l'équilibre est défini à la manière de Guerrieri et autres (2010), qui appliquent des restrictions aux croyances hors équilibre des vendeurs quant à la probabilité de rencontrer différents types d'acheteurs. L'étude fait en outre ressortir qu'une menace de contrefaçon peut entraîner l'effondrement de l'équilibre monétaire. L'auteur présente une extension du modèle dans laquelle cette menace peut se concrétiser du fait que certains acheteurs n'ont pas connaissance des offres et procèdent par conséquent à la prospection de manière aléatoire. Ce sont ces acheteurs qui peuvent produire de faux billets.
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