Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Background. Despite the popularity of inner-speech theories of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), little is known about the phenomenological qualities of inner speech in patients with schizophrenia who experience AVHs (Sz-AVHs), or how this compares to inner speech in the non-voice-hearing general population.Method. We asked Sz-AVHs (n=29) and a non-voice-hearing general population sample (n=42) a series of questions about their experiences of hearing voices, if present, and their inner speech.Results. The inner speech reported by patients and controls was found to be almost identical in all respects. Furthermore, phenomenological qualities of AVHs (e.g. second-or third-person voices) did not relate to corresponding qualities in inner speech.Conclusions. No discernable differences were found between the inner speech reported by Sz-AVHs and healthy controls. Implications for inner-speech theories of AVHs are discussed.

Facial impressions of trustworthiness guide social decisions in the general population, as shown by financial lending in economic Trust Games. As an exception, autistic boys fail to use facial impressions to guide trust decisions, despite forming typical facial trustworthiness impressions (Autism, 19, 2015a, 1002). Here, we tested whether this dissociation between forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness extends to neurotypical men with high levels of autistic traits. Forty‐six Caucasian men completed a multi‐turn Trust Game, a facial trustworthiness impressions task, the Autism‐Spectrum Quotient, and two Theory of Mind tasks. As hypothesized, participants’ levels of autistic traits had no observed effect on the impressions formed, but negatively predicted the use of those impressions in trust decisions. Thus, the dissociation between forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness extends to the broader autism phenotype. More broadly, our results identify autistic traits as an important source of individual variation in the use of facial impressions to guide behaviour. Interestingly, failure to use these impressions could potentially represent rational behaviour, given their limited validity.

Schizophrenia typically involves poor social functioning. This may be due, in part, to deficits in theory-of-mind, the cognitive ability to reason flexibly about the mental states of others. Patients also have deficits in social knowledge. It is currently unclear how these two impairments interrelate in schizophrenia. To address this issue, 43 patients with schizophrenia and 25 healthy controls completed two theory-of-mind tests and a novel test of social judgment. This latter measure required participants to judge whether various social behaviors were normal or reasonable in the context in which the behaviors occurred. Whereas patients demonstrated clear deficits in theory-of-mind, they performed similarly to controls when judging socially appropriate behaviors and violations of social norms. Patients, however, were less likely than controls to judge social behavior as reasonable when the behavior was impolite but understandable if the characters’ thoughts were taken into account. This latter difficulty correlated with patients’ performance deficits on the theory-of-mind tasks. Overall, findings suggest that basic social knowledge is intact in schizophrenia, though judgments of social behavior are affected by patients’ theory-of-mind deficits.