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Abstract:The article deals with the factors which infl uence effi ciency of public procurement in the competitive contracting conducted through e-auctions in 15 Slovak cities. Data cover building and IT contracts awarded in the years [2007][2008][2009]. Together 186 observations were used for the analysis. The article starts with a theoretical discussion on the factors infl uencing effi ciency of the procurement including potential impacts of the e-procurement and the e-auction. Than fi ve hypotheses are formulated and the set of data is described. The next part introduces results of the regression analyses. It shows indirect proportion of the relation between the number of the submitted bids and the winning price. Each additional bid brings decrease of the price by approximately 3.4% of the expected price. The use of the e-auctions is connected with an increase of the number of the submitted bids by 0.7, which mean an average decrease of the winning price by approximately 2.4% of the expected price. The article concludes that the application of the e-auctions brings an indirect impact on the winning price. The reason is that it is more transparent than "standard" tenders. It probably affects the trust of bidders and increases of their number.

Th is paper focuses on the transparency of Slovak municipalities. It identifi es the main trends in the transparency of the 100 largest Slovak municipalities between 2010 and 2014. It shows that there are diff erent degrees of transparency in Slovak municipalities, and it applies regressions to explore correlates and identify the main factors behind this state. Th is research is descriptive and explanatory and adds to literature by examining political, structural factors related to the political supply of the transparency of the municipalities and the convergence eff ect. Th e regression analysis identifi es the convergence eff ect, according to which the transparency of municipalities improves inversely to their initial score. It also fi nds a negative incumbency eff ect that indicates lower improvement for incumbent mayors than for new ones. Th e size of a municipality is also one of the factors that determine the transparency level of that municipality. Th is relationship is positive -greater size of a municipality increases the level of its transparency.

Summary / Abstract Discussion of politico-administrative relations as well as the research on agencies generally treats the “politicisation” of agency management as a single, “black-box” concept, according to which agency managements (and other senior civil servants) are either political or not. Our paper shows that, using a strict, but widely applied definition of what constitutes a political appointment, agency heads in Slovakia are overwhelmingly “political”, but that the implications of politicisation vary, depending on the type of politicisation. In particular, we distinguish personal nominations of the responsible minister and contrast them with party nominations based on coalition agreements. Based on a series of interviews with senior policy-makers on both sides of the politico-administrative divide, we show that the selection mechanism, incentive structure and robustness of actual accountability mechanisms differs more between these two types of politicisations than between the ministerial and formally “non-political” appointment.

Institut veřejných zakázek je využíván k alokaci poměrně značné části veřejných vý-dajů. Odhady OECD (2007) ukazují, že členské země této mezinárodní organizace vynakládají tímto způsobem 15 až 20 % HDP. Zároveň je tento institut poměrně ná-chylný ke korupčnímu jednání a k ekonomické neefektivnosti. Jednou z oblastí, která dosud nebyla téměř zkoumána a která může velmi významně fungování tohoto institutu ovlivnit, je postkontraktační chování zadavatelů. Ve své podstatě se jedná o dodatečné změny ve smlouvách, které byly uzavřeny na základě zákona o veřejných zakáz-kách (o veřejném obstarávání). Na rozdíl od předkontraktačního chování (výběr dodavatele), které tato norma i příslušné směrnice Evropského parlamentu a Rady poměrně podrobně upravují, je zde určité "právní vakuum", které může být poměrně jednoduše zneužito, zejména pokud není zakotvena a vynucována povinná publicita v oblasti smluv a jejich dodatků.Předložený článek analyzuje postkontraktační chování na vzorku slovenských zadavatelů působících na obecní i centrální úrovni. Snahou je přinést informace o tom, jak významné (zejména z hlediska dopadu na cenu) jsou dodatečné změny ve smlouvách uzavřených podle zákona o veřejném obstarávání a jaké faktory ovlivňují pravděpodobnost uzavření dodatků a jejich rozsah. Na tomto místě je nutné uvést, že v domácí ani v zahraniční odborné literatuře nebylo toto téma dosud zpracováváno (což se projevuje relativně "chudou" diskusí zahraničních příspěvků v následující kapitole). Zvolené téma (i použitý metodický přístup) je tak poměrně inovativní a rozšiřuje ekonomickou analýzu na další oblast zadávání veřejných zakázek.Článek je rozdělen do čtyř hlavních částí. První obsahuje krátký popis životního cyklu veřejné zakázky a specifikuje pozici postkontrakční fáze v něm. Zároveň jsou stručně analyzovány zákonné podmínky, které musí být splněny, aby mohlo dojít ke změně smluv. Druhá část se věnuje formulaci a zdůvodnění výzkumných hypotéz. Třetí * Tento příspěvek vznikl s podporou GA ČR v rámci řešení projektu č. P403/11/0458 "Analýza efektivnosti veřejných zakázek".

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Abstract:This paper is based on the new institutional economic approach, which focuses on analysis between services features (asset speciicity, outcome measurability) and their eligibility to contract out. This issue, which de facto constitutes one of the subsets of the "make or buy decision" issue, is also analysed by the so-called Brown-Potoski model. It analyses the relations between selected features of a demanded service and its suitability or unsuitability for outsourcing, whilst making use of information about transaction costs economy. Using data from 100 Czech municipalities and 100 Slovak municipalities, the viability of the Brown-Potoski model is tested. The results of the research show that a connection was identiied between the measurability of the required service and its suitability for external provision, but the relationship between the speciicity of investments and the suitability for external provision was not. The reason is probably the previous inancial demands of the initial investment, which is, above all in the case of small municipalities, beyond their budgetary means.

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