Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities

Pavel, Jan; Sičáková-Beblavá, Emília

doi:10.18267/j.pep.443

Cited by 25 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Reference [16] found that the level of participation of the auction participants in the procurement of goods and services for Turkish government is relatively higher than the procurement of construction projects. On the other hand, [24] found that there is no significant difference in the number of auction participants for the procurement of building works, the procurement of transportation infrastructures and the procurement of information and technology. Based on the preceding explanation, we subsequently propose the following hypothesis (H 2 ): H 2 : Type of procurement has an effect on the number of auction participants…”

Section: Procurement Type and The Number Of Auctionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Investigating The Success of Public Procurement Innovation in Government Organization: Does e-Procurement Really Work?

Prayudi¹,

Herawati²,

Dewi³

2019

Proceedings of the International Conference on Tourism, Economics, Accounting, Management, and Social Science (TEAMS 2018)

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Despite the lengthy implementation periods of electronic procurement (e-procurement) as one of strategic public innovations, there is still a lack of empirical research on its potential benefits and outcomes in the context of governmental sector. Meanwhile, the examination about how the competitive environment affects e-procurement implementation is also remaining unclear. The present study aims to investigate the relationships between estimated cost of procurement, procurement type, number of auction participants and the efficiency of e-procurement practices in government organization. For this purpose, a dataset provided by the Electronic Procurement Service Unit of Badung Local Government of Bali Province that covers the entire government procurement auction for the years 2012-2017 were analyzed using a linear regression analysis. Results indicated a positive and significant relationship between the estimated cost and the number of auction participants of government eprocurement. In addition, the type of procurement significantly affects the number of auction participants. Procurement auctions for goods and for construction are found to have a stronger effect than the services auctions on the increasing number of auction participants. Finally, the number of auction participants has a positive and significant impact on the efficiency of the procurement in local government organization. These findings have several implications on design of government e-procurement.

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Section: Procurement Type and The Number Of Auctionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Investigating The Success of Public Procurement Innovation in Government Organization: Does e-Procurement Really Work?

Prayudi¹,

Herawati²,

Dewi³

2019

Proceedings of the International Conference on Tourism, Economics, Accounting, Management, and Social Science (TEAMS 2018)

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“…They conclude that allowing foreign participants to participate in the auction and the threshold value for conducting an auction have notable effects on the number of bidders and the auction price. Based on the auction data from Slovak municipalities, Pavel et al (2013) investigate the factors that may affect the auction prices and the efficiency of e-auctions. Their work shows that each additional bid submitted in the auction leads to a decrease in the auction price.…”

Section: E-auction Studies With the Public Sector Datasetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, in the literature, the number of studies focused on the factors that have notable effects on the buyer surplus has increased significantly. In this research stream, typically, the impacts of the number of bidders (Millet et al 2004, Mithas and Jones 2007, Park et al 2012, Onur et al 2012, Gurakar and Taş 2015, Raventós and Zolezzi 2015, the number of submitted bids (Millet et al 2004, Mithas and Jones 2007, Pavel et al 2013, Raventós and Zolezzi 2015, the amount of auctioning item (Bapna et al 2003, Koppius et al 2004, Pearcy and Giunipero 2006, Park et al 2012, the auction duration (Mithas andJones 2007, Raventós andZolezzi 2015), the reservation price (Bapna et al 2003, Kauffman and Wood 2006, Mithas and Jones 2007, Onur et al 2012, Pavel et al 2013, the ranking information during the auction (Millet et al 2004, Mithas and Jones 2007, Elmaghraby et al 2012, Tunca et al 2014, Setia and Speier-Pero 2015, the information about the auctioning item -description, photo, etc.- (Koppius et al 2004, Kauffman and Wood 2006, Stoll and Zöttl 2014, the non-price attributes of the auctioning item (Koppius et al 2004, Engelbrecht et al 2007, Haruvy and Katok 2013, Tunca et al 2014, Stoll and Zöttl 2014, Moretti and Valbonesi 2015, and the supplier incumbe...…”

Section: Research Framework and Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of the main drivers affecting the buyer surplus in E-auctions

Karabağ

Tan

2018

International Journal of Production Research

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We empirically examine the impacts of the product category, the auction format, the 2008 global financial crisis, the group purchasing, the contract type, the platform ownership, and the number of participating suppliers on the buyer surplus obtained from e-auctions. To this end, we collect a unique dataset from a purchasing organization that offers e-auction solutions to its corporate customers. By using a standard Tobit model, we show that the product categories, the auction type, and the number of participating suppliers have significant effects on the decrease in the procurement prices with respect to the minimum of the initial submitted bids. It is observed that the 2008 global financial crisis led to an increase in the buyer surplus. We classify the product categories into three groups based on their impacts on the average of the decrease in the procurement prices. We show that the average decrease in procurement prices is higher for the group purchasing option than for the individual buying option. It is concluded that the types of contract between buyers and auctioneer and the platform ownership have no statistically significant effects on the average decrease in procurement prices.

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“…Vlivem počtu uchazečů na vysoutěženou cenu se zabývají rovněž Nemec a Grega (2015) či v případě zakázek na elektřinu a zemní plyn Soudek a Skuhrovec (2013). Vliv elektronických aukcí na efektivnost zadávání veřejných zakázek zkoumají Pavel, Sičáková-Beblavá (2013). Ochrana a Pavel (2013) potom analyzují problematiku transparentnosti a korupce ve veřejných zakázkách.…”

Section: Teoretická Východiskaunclassified

Price Determination in Public Procurement: Simulation

Schmidt¹

2016

Politicka ekonomie

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Price Determination in Public Procurement: SimulationThe article examines a mechanism of bid price determination in public procurement by individual tenderers. An auction model based on game theory, which maximizes expected profit of a firm bidding for public contract, is used to analyse this process. Firm within the model decides by comparing expected profit and transaction costs associated with submitting the bid whether to submit the bid or not. Furthermore, the article analyzes empirical data on public works contracts in the field of construction and reconstruction of wastewater treatment plants in the Czech Republic. The probability distribution of bid prices submitted by individual firms is mainly examined on these data. Based on the presented model and some finding from the data, a simulation of sequential biddings is executed consequently in which individual firms in their decision making use available data on submitted bids from the previous contracts.Keywords: public procurement, competitive bidding, bids, bid prices, simulation JEL Classification: H57, D44 ÚvodProstřednictvím veřejných zakázek probíhá významná část ekonomické aktivity ve společ-nosti. V rámci České republiky je odhadováno, že objem veřejných zakázek v roce 2013 tvořil 13,5 % HDP (MMR, 2015). Tato část produkce, jež je alokována formou veřejných zakázek, je specifická tím, že celý kontraktační proces je značně regulovaný prostřed-nictvím zákona o veřejných zakázkách 1 . Tato regulace se vztahuje převážně na postup zadavatele, ale ovlivňuje i jednotlivé uchazeče o veřejnou zakázku, tj. soukromé subjekty. Zákon o veřejných zakázkách či následně zadavatel v zadávací dokumentaci například upravují požadavky na podobu nabídky, doklady vyžadované v rámci kvalifikace či poža-davky na zpracování nabídkové ceny. Tyto faktory následně mají vliv na průběh konkrét-ního zadávacího řízení a jeho výsledek, tedy i na dosaženou cenu za poptávané plnění.Samotný proces stanovení konečné nabídkové ceny je ve veřejných zakázkách do určité míry specifický, neboť se typicky jedná o formu aukce (ať už prostřednictvím obálkové metody, či elektronické aukce). Důležitou roli z hlediska efektivnosti alokace zdrojů dosažené prostřednictvím veřejných zakázek tak hraje rozhodování jednotlivých uchazečů o tom, jakou stanoví za daných podmínek nabídkovou cenu.Předmětem tohoto článku je právě analýza způsobu stanovení nabídkových cen jednotlivými uchazeči o veřejnou zakázku při využití tradiční obálkové metody (tj. tajné dražby s první cenou). Ve středu zájmu jsou zejména zakázky, ve kterých jsou nabídky 1 Zákon č. 137/2006 Sb., o veřejných zakázkách, ve znění pozdějších předpisů.

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Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities

Cited by 25 publications

References 17 publications

Investigating The Success of Public Procurement Innovation in Government Organization: Does e-Procurement Really Work?

Investigating The Success of Public Procurement Innovation in Government Organization: Does e-Procurement Really Work?

An empirical analysis of the main drivers affecting the buyer surplus in E-auctions

Price Determination in Public Procurement: Simulation

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