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This paper establishes a general equivalence between discrete choice and rational inattention models. Matejka and McKay (2015, AER) showed that when information costs are modelled using the Shannon entropy function, the resulting choice probabilities in the rational inattention model take the multinomial logit form. By exploiting convex-analytic properties of the discrete choice model, we show that when information costs are modelled using a class of generalized entropy functions, the choice probabilities in any rational inattention model are observationally equivalent to some additive random utility discrete choice model and vice versa. Thus any additive random utility model can be given an interpretation in terms of boundedly rational behavior. This includes empirically relevant specifications such as the probit and nested logit models

This article establishes a general equivalence between discrete choice and rational inattention models. Matějka and McKay (2015) showed that when information costs are modeled using the Shannon entropy, the choice probabilities in the rational inattention (RI) model take the multinomial logit form. We show that, for one given prior over states, RI choice probabilities may take the form of any additive random utility discrete choice model (ARUM) when the information cost is a Bregman information, a class defined in this article. The prior information of the rationally inattentive agent is summarized in a constant vector of utilities in the corresponding ARUM.

This paper develops a non-parametric test for consistency of players' behavior in a series of games with the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities in any structural QRE as the gradient of a convex function, which thus satisfies the cyclic monotonicity inequalities. Our testing procedure utilizes recent econometric results for moment inequality models. We assess our test using lab experimental data from a series of generalized matching pennies games. We reject the QRE hypothesis in the pooled data, but it cannot be rejected in the individual data for over half of the subjects.JEL codes: C12, C14, C57, C72, C92

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We develop a nonparametric test for consistency of player behavior with the quantal response equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities in any structural QRE as the gradient of a convex function; thereby, QRE-consistent choices satisfy the cyclic monotonicity inequalities. Our testing procedure utilizes recent econometric results for moment inequality models. We assess our test using lab experimental data from a series of generalized matching pennies games. We reject the QRE hypothesis in the pooled data but cannot reject individual-level quantal response behavior for over half of the subjects. * Manuscript

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