Two studies tested the effects of negotiators' social motive (cooperative vs. individualistic) and punitive capability (high vs. low) on trust, negotiation behavior, and joint outcomes. On the basis of structural goal-expectation theory (T. Yamagishi, 1986), it was predicted that in the case of a cooperative motive higher levels of punitive capability lead to less trust, less exchange of information about preferences and priorities, and agreements of lower joint outcome. Study 1 (N = 41) supported this prediction: Cooperative negotiators had lower trust, exchanged less information, and attained lower joint outcomes under high rather than low punitive capability; individualistic negotiators were not influenced by punitive capability, presumably because they have low levels of trust to start with. Study 2 (yV = 21) showed that these effects happened because higher levels of punitive capability increase conflict avoidance in negotiators with a cooperative motive.The social climate within groups and organizations is crucial to their performance and survival. Theory and research traditionally paid attention to social support, cohesion, achievement orientation, risk taking, innovation (Denison, 1996), and, more recently, the role of trust and procedural justice in interpersonal and intergroup interaction (Blount, Bazerman, & Neale, 1995;Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). In addition, there is increasing interest in the various motives that guide the development of trust and fair behavior (Kramer & Tyler, 1996;Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995). Accordingly, the current research was concerned with the role of social motives and trust in negotiation-the joint decision making between parties aimed at reaching agreement about their perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt, 1981). We compared cooperative with individualistic motives and examined the ne-