The present research addresses the relationship between morally valenced behavior and perceptions of self-knowledge, an outcome that has received little attention in moral psychology. We propose that morally valenced behavior is related to subjective perceptions of self-knowledge, such that people experience lower levels of self-knowledge when they are reminded of their immoral behaviors. We tested this proposition in four studies ( N = 1,177). Study 1 used daily-diary methods and indicates that daily perceptions of self-knowledge covary with daily levels of morally valenced behavior. The final three studies made use of experimental methods and demonstrate that thinking about immoral behaviors attenuates current perceptions of self-knowledge. The predicted relationships and effects generally persist when controlling for self-esteem. Based on our findings, we argue that perceived self-knowledge may play a functional role in moral self-concept maintenance and moral regulatory processes.

Undermining the belief in free will influences thoughts and behavior, yet little research has explored its implications for the self and identity. The current studies examined whether lowering free will beliefs reduces perceived true self-knowledge. First, a new free will manipulation was validated. Next, in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to high belief or low belief in free will conditions and completed measures of true self-knowledge. In Study 2, participants completed the same free will manipulation and a moral decision-making task. We then assessed participants’ perceived sense of authenticity during the task. Results illustrated that attenuating free will beliefs led to less self-knowledge, such that participants reported feeling more alienated from their true selves and experienced lowered perceptions of authenticity while making moral decisions. The interplay between free will and the true self are discussed.

No abstract

Research has found that counterfactual reflection, the act of mentally undoing past events, imbues major life experiences with meaning. The current studies examined whether individual differences in free will beliefs moderate this relationship. Participants described a significant event in their lives, were randomly assigned to counterfactual or factual reflection about the event, and completed measures of meaning and free will. Two studies found that counterfactual reflection enhanced the meaningfulness of life events for people with high belief in free will but not for people with low belief in free will. These studies suggest that beliefs in free will are an important factor in meaning-making processes.

No abstract