A central tenet of many prominent philosophical and psychological traditions is that personal authenticity facilitates psychological well-being. This idea, however, is at odds with numerous perspectives arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to really know one's self, or the true self may not even exist. Moreover, empirical findings suggest that reports of authenticity are often contaminated by positively valenced behavior, further potentially undermining the validity of authenticity measures. Despite these concerns, we argue that subjective feelings of authenticity do uniquely contribute to well-being. Specifically, we argue that the relationship between perceived authenticity and well-being may be understood from a social-cognitive lay theory perspective that we label "true-self-as-guide," that suggests people use these feelings of authenticity as a cue to evaluate whether they are living up to a shared cultural value of what it means to live a good life. We end with a call for future research on the antecedents of perceived authenticity, boundary conditions for the consequences of personal authenticity, and discuss cultural differences in true-self-as-guide lay theories.

Why do many people come to believe that they and others have a true self? We hypothesized that this belief emerges because people routinely rely on essentialist reasoning to understand personal identity and the self. Across eight studies, we found that (a) the features that participants attributed to the true self resembled the features typically attributed to essences (e.g., immutability, informativeness, inherence; Studies 1–4); (b) endorsement of belief in true selves correlated with endorsement of other essentialist beliefs (Study 5); and (c) experimental manipulations of essentialist beliefs in domains other than the self spilled over and affected participants’ endorsement of belief in true selves (Studies 6–8). These findings advance theory on the origins and functions of beliefs about the true self, suggesting that these beliefs are, in part, a specific downstream consequence of the broader tendency to explain phenomena in the world in terms of underlying essences.

The present research addresses the relationship between morally valenced behavior and perceptions of self-knowledge, an outcome that has received little attention in moral psychology. We propose that morally valenced behavior is related to subjective perceptions of self-knowledge, such that people experience lower levels of self-knowledge when they are reminded of their immoral behaviors. We tested this proposition in four studies ( N = 1,177). Study 1 used daily-diary methods and indicates that daily perceptions of self-knowledge covary with daily levels of morally valenced behavior. The final three studies made use of experimental methods and demonstrate that thinking about immoral behaviors attenuates current perceptions of self-knowledge. The predicted relationships and effects generally persist when controlling for self-esteem. Based on our findings, we argue that perceived self-knowledge may play a functional role in moral self-concept maintenance and moral regulatory processes.

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Why do many people come to believe that they and others have a true self? We hypothesized that this belief emerges because people routinely rely on essentialist reasoning to understand personal identity and the self. Across eight studies, we found that (1) the features that participants attributed to the true self resembled the features typically attributed to essences (e.g., immutability, informativeness, inherence; Studies 1–4); (2) endorsement of belief in true selves correlated with endorsement of other essentialist beliefs (Study 5); and (3) experimental manipulations of essentialist beliefs in domains other than the self “spilled over” and affected participants’ endorsement of belief in true selves (Studies 6–8). These findings advance theory on the origins and functions of beliefs about the true self, suggesting that these beliefs are, in part, a specific downstream consequence of the broader tendency to explain phenomena in the world in terms of underlying essences.

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The idea of true selves is widespread in folk psychology. Most research on this topic has focused on the precursors to and consequences of feeling that one knows or is expressing one’s own true self. As such, little is known about the conditions under which people feel like they know the true selves of others. In five studies (total N = 815), we tested and found support for the hypothesis that moral information is inherently tied to perceived knowledge of others’ true selves. Across all studies, using both descriptive texts (Studies 1–3) and computer-generated faces as stimuli (Studies 4 and 5), participants felt that they knew more about the true selves of highly moral targets relative to other targets and, conversely, believed the targets possessed more moral traits when they felt that they knew the individual’s true self.

Two studies ( N = 649) examined the association between self-alienation (SA; i.e., feelings of detachment from one’s true self) and academic amotivation (AA; i.e., lack of motivation in the academic domain). Based on classical and contemporary theories, a strong link between alienation and amotivation was predicted. A cross-sectional correlation study (Study 1) found that SA significantly predicted AA controlling for relevant variables (e.g., self-efficacy). A four-wave longitudinal design (Study 2) tested the reciprocal relationship between SA and AA within persons. Contrary to the a priori hypothesis that SA would predict amotivation, the path from AA to SA was more consistent and reliable than the other path. The potential bidirectional links between SA and AA, implications, and future directions are discussed.