Imitation requires the imitator to solve the correspondence problem – to translate visual information from modelled action into matching motor output. It has been widely accepted for some 30 years that the correspondence problem is solved by a specialized, innate cognitive mechanism. This is the conclusion of a poverty of the stimulus argument, realized in the active intermodal matching model of imitation, which assumes that human neonates can imitate a range of body movements. An alternative, wealth of the stimulus argument, embodied in the associative sequence learning model of imitation, proposes that the correspondence problem is solved by sensorimotor learning, and that the experience necessary for this kind of learning is provided by the sociocultural environment during human development. In a detailed and wide‐ranging review of research on imitation and imitation‐relevant behaviour in infancy and beyond, we find substantially more evidence in favour of the wealth argument than of the poverty argument.

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Infants are sensitive to biological motion, but do they recognize it as animate? As a first step towards answering this question, two experiments investigated whether 6-month-olds selectively attribute goals to shapes moving like animals. We habituated infants to a square moving towards one of two targets. When target locations were switched, infants reacted more to movement towards a new goal than a new location - but only if the square moved non-rigidly and rhythmically, in a schematic version of bio-mechanical movement older observers describe as animal-like (Michotte, 1963). Goal attribution was specific to schematic animal motion: It did not occur if the square moved rigidly with the same rhythm as the animate stimulus, or if the square had the same amount of non-rigid deformation, but in an inanimate configuration. The data would seem to show that perception of schematic animal motion is linked to a system for psychological reasoning from infancy. This in turn suggests that 6-month-olds may already interpret biological motion as animate.

In Experiment 1, rats experienced 2 stimuli (A and N) each preceded by the same event (food) or by different events (food preceded 1 but not the other). N was then paired with shock, and the generalization of conditioned suppression to A was assessed. Generalization was more marked when A and N had been experienced along with a common antecedent. In Experiment 2, 3 stimuli (A, B, and N) were presented in initial training. For 1 group, A and N were preceded by food and B was not; for a 2nd group A alone was preceded by food. In each group, suppression generalized more readily from N to the stimulus that had received the same initial training as had been given to N. Experiment 3 found that generalization was not enhanced between stimuli when 1 had preceded food in initial training and 1 had followed it. These results demonstrate that stimuli that have shared a common antecedent will come to be treated as equivalent.