Imitation in infancy: the wealth of the stimulus

Abstract

Imitation requires the imitator to solve the correspondence problem – to translate visual information from modelled action into matching motor output. It has been widely accepted for some 30 years that the correspondence problem is solved by a specialized, innate cognitive mechanism. This is the conclusion of a poverty of the stimulus argument, realized in the active intermodal matching model of imitation, which assumes that human neonates can imitate a range of body movements. An alternative, wealth of the stimulus argument, embodied in the associative sequence learning model of imitation, proposes that the correspondence problem is solved by sensorimotor learning, and that the experience necessary for this kind of learning is provided by the sociocultural environment during human development. In a detailed and wide‐ranging review of research on imitation and imitation‐relevant behaviour in infancy and beyond, we find substantially more evidence in favour of the wealth argument than of the poverty argument.

Contextual modulation of mirror and countermirror sensorimotor associations.

“…The ASL model (Heyes, 2001(Heyes, , 2010a(Heyes, , 2010bRay & Heyes, 2011) proposes that automatic imitation, and the congruent MNs that are thought to mediate automatic imitation, are a product of sensorimotor associations acquired during development, e.g. through selfobservation, synchronous activity and while being imitated.…”

“…Many of the sensorimotor contingencies we experience are matching, where observed and executed actions correspond, and therefore give rise to congruent MNs and automatic imitation. Experience of this kind is provided by, for example, visual monitoring of one's own actions, synchronous activity in response to a common stimulus, and being imitated by others (Ray & Heyes, 2011). However, exposure to non-matching sensorimotor contingencies may cause the emergence of non-congruent MNs through the same learning mechanisms (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010).…”

“…neonate executes smile) and action observation (e.g. neonate 24 observes caregiver smiling) (Ray & Heyes, 2011). The early acquisition of mirror associations may cause 'mirroring' to become the default, context-general response which manifests in novel situations.…”

Mirroring ‘meaningful’ actions: Sensorimotor learning modulates imitation of goal-directed actions

“…If correct, this would suggest that the ability to imitate others is a special-purpose cognitive module which is genetically inherited (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003;Oberman, Hubbard, & McCleery, 2014). However, the studies of newborns have been challenged on a number of grounds, including by evidence that neonatal imitation may be limited to one action, tongue protrusion (Anisfeld, 1979;Ray & Heyes, 2011); by the suggestion that such 'imitation' may in fact be an arousal response (Jones, 1996(Jones, , 2006; and, most recently, by a large-scale longitudinal study which found no evidence for neonatal imitation and indicated that previous positive results were due to methodological and statistical artefacts (Oostenbroek et al, 2016).…”

Sensorimotor learning and the ontogeny of the mirror neuron system

“…In summary, in both macaques and humans there are a limited number of behaviours which appear to be imitated at birth, but they are not stimulus-specific and the short-lived nature of the effects means they are unlikely to be mediated by the same neural mechanisms that underlie later imitative abilities. Discussion of the development of imitation in later human infancy is beyond the scope of this paper, but a recent review [57] suggests that imitation develops in accordance with the amount of sensorimotor experience received by the infant.…”