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SummaryPrior work-life research has highlighted that while organizations may be introducing more work-life policies, organizational members are not necessarily using these policies. Empirical research is needed that focuses on the individual and provides insight into who is taking advantage of these policies and how they go about negotiating access. In this study, we explore this issue as we investigate the behavioral dynamics that underlie women's experiences negotiating a flexible work arrangement. Focusing on the individual, we examine the influence that perceptions of power and organizational work-life support have on flexible work arrangement negotiations. The results of our research indicate that both macro level factors such as perceived work life support and micro level factors such as perceptions of power affect both the process and outcomes of these negotiations. We explore the implications these findings have for work-life and negotiation research.

The technological revolution has created as many challenges as opportunities for managers in today's organizations. Besides “wandering around” to manage, “scrolling around” on a computer screen has become common‐place. This article reviews four key technology‐caused challenges facing managers in the workplace, chiefly as the result of communication via e‐mail. Specifically, the author focuses on what research to date informs us about negotiation and conflict resolution in an electronic environment.

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist's appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes' and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that "without a formal framework for explicating this concept of 'structure-similarity' it remains vague, just as Giere's concept of similarity between models does …" (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103-120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French's (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187-207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner's programmes, it was the context of considering the 'relevant symmetries' that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models.

This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism. Central to our investigation is the notion of ‘shared structure’. We begin with a description of mathematical structuralism and use this to point out analogies and disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world connection, this use being crucially important to both the contemporary structural empiricist and realist. We show why minimal scientific structuralism is, at the very least, a powerful methodological standpoint. Our investigation also makes explicit what more must be added to this minimal structuralist position in order to address the theory-world connection, namely, an account of representation.