Two sides have emerged in the debate over the merits of American individualism. This article enters that debate first by differentiating between two indigenous psychologies of individualism, varying by the nature of the self-nonself boundary, the understanding of control as personal or field, and the conceptualization of persons as defined by their exclusiveness or their inclusiveness. Selfcontained individualism (firm boundaries, personal control, and an exclusionary concept of the person) is the familiar cultural type, addressed both by proponents and opponents of individualism. An alternate indigenous psychology, which I term ensembled individualism, is supported by cross-culturaL historical and intracultural evidence and defines a contrasting framework for understanding individualism. Three core cultural values-freedom, responsibility, and achievement--are examined under the auspices of each type. Contrary to the proponents of self-contained individualism, who state that only this type of individualism can realize these three values, I suggest not only that ensembled individualism can achieve these cultural ideals in a more lasting manner, but also that the self-contained form may actually thwart their realization.

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A critical analysis of some of the major work in cognitive social, personality, and developmental psychology is offered. The author argues that cognitivism, by virtue of the primacy it gives to the individual knower, to subjective determinants of behavior, and to formal cognitive operations, represents a set of values and interests that reproduce and reaffirm the existing nature of the social order. But the joining of cognitive psychology with ideology is not simply intended to unmask the values carried by the cognitivist approach. The issue of values also raises serious questions about the nature of psychological science. Four case examples are critically examined as the basis for the claims made in this article: (1) the deficiencies of interactionism, (2) cognitivism's denial of reality, (S) psychological reifications, and ( 4) cognitive-developmental theory and the technical interest in knowledge. A concluding comment calls for a new and transformative psychology, not of what is, but of what may yet be.

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