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The essential insight advanced in this paper is that the claim that inflation can impair growth makes most sense in the context of a monetary production economy, wherein a role for money in the determination of real activity is posited from the very start. We construct a model of inflation and growth that distinguishes between the properties of various qualitatively different inflation regimes. It is then shown how some of these regimes, by undermining confidence in various nominal contracts that are central to the process of accumulation in a monetary production economy, can adversely affect growth.

ResumoO presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar as políticas de estabilização de curto prazo propostas pelo Plano Trienal (1962) e pelo Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo (1964) através da comparação das principais medidas implementadas e dos resultados alcançados pelos dois planos. No caso, pretende-se mostrar que os planos tinham semelhanças, sendo a política salarial do PAEG o principal ponto de distinção. Nesse contexto, as grandes diferenças de desempenho foram devidas à incapacidade do Trienal -em função dos turbulentos contextos interno e externo -de equacionar os problemas do conflito distributivo e do estrangulamento externo. O PAEG, por sua vez, equacionou os dois problemas, mas resolveu o conflito distributivo através de uma solução regressiva e, no caso do estrangulamento externo, obteve uma ajuda norte-americana com a qual o Plano Trienal não pôde contar. Palavras-Chave políticas de estabilização, Plano Trienal, PAEG AbstractThis work discusses the short term stabilisation policies implemented by two plansThree-Year Plan (Trienal) of 1962) and the Government's Economic Action Programme (PAEG) of 1964 -in order to compare their main measures and results. It is intended to show that these plans had similarities being PAEG's wage policy the main point of difference. In this context, their performance differences were due to the turbulent internal and external contexts that the Three-Year Plan faced and that left it unable to solve the problems related to the distributive conflict and the external constraint. The Government's Economic Action Plan solved these problems, but the solution employed in terms of the conflicting claims was a regressive one and the external constraint was overcome with a help of US authorities that was not offered to the Three-Year Plan.♦ Agradeço a Almir Pita, Carlos Pinkusfeld Bastos, Fabio Sá Earp e Franklin Serrano por comentários e sugestões a versões anteriores do artigo, e a Maurício Metri, Ralph Zerkowski e Ricardo Bielschowsky pelas discussões sobre o tema deste trabalho. Agradeço ainda aos pareceristas anônimos da revista por seus comentários. Os eventuais erros e omissões remanescentes são de minha responsabilidade.

This paper develops a model of inflation in an open economy. The model permits analysis of the susceptibility of open economies to permanent inflationary consequences arising from transitory foreign exchange shocks. Sources of structural vulnerability to such events are identified, and means of addressing these structural vulnerabilities are discussed. Ultimately, the paper arrives at a ‘structuralist inflation targeting agenda’. Based on a proper conception of inflation dynamics, this involves ‘getting inflation targeting right’ rather than either accepting mainstream inflation targeting prescriptions or simply neglecting inflation altogether.

This paper develops a model of inflation in an open economy. The model permits analysis of the susceptibility of open economies to permanent inflationary consequences arising from transitory foreign exchange shocks. Sources of structural vulnerability to such events are identified, and means of addressing these structural vulnerabilities are discussed. Ultimately, the paper arrives at a "structuralist inflation targeting agenda". Based on a proper conception of inflation dynamics, this involves "getting inflation targeting right" rather than either accepting mainstream inflation targeting prescriptions or simply neglecting inflation altogether.

No abstract

En la década de 1990, Argentina y Brasil siguieron estrategias económicas parecidas. Sin embargo, las crisis cambiarias que Brasil sufrió en 1998-1999 y la Argentina en 2001-2002, acabaron siendo un punto de inflexión, ya que después de las crisis los dos países optaron por regímenes macroeconómicos muy diferentes. Este artículo tiene como objetivo discutir las experiencias de Argentina y Brasil bajo estos distintos regímenes macroeconómicos. Particularmente queremos analizar: 1) las principales características de los dos regímenes macroeconómicos; 2) las razones que llevaron a los argentinos y los brasileños a optar por estrategias diferentes después de sus respectivas crisis cambiarias; 3) los resultados alcanzados por los dos países en la década pasada; 4) los principales desafíos que estos dos regímenes enfrentan hoy.

This paper studies the episodes of inflation upsurge in Brazil from 1951 to 1985, a period wherein Brazilian inflation rates were among the highest in the world. It identifies the episodes of inflation upsurge within this period and analyzes whether they were concomitant with and/or preceded by some type of external shock (exchange rate devaluations and/or commodity price shocks). Based on this relationship this paper identifies eight episodes of inflation upsurge and shows that seven out of these eight episodes followed such pattern. We show also that such analysis is strongly associated with the traditional structuralist Latin American inflation theory.