Abstract. Hypotheses about the P3 component of the event-related EEG potential have usually assumed that P3b reflects some processing independent from organizing the response. In contrast, the notion that P3b is related to a decision process implies some mediating function between stimulus and response. If P3b does indeed reflect the link between perceptual processing and response preparation (1) amplitudes should be as large in response-locked averages as in stimulus-locked averages, (2) this should be true independent of response speed, for separate subaverages of slow and fast responses, and (3) latencies should vary across response speed both in stimulus-locked and in response-locked averages. These hypotheses were tested in data evoked by visual and auditory stimuli in choice-response tasks. All three predictions were confirmed. In contrast to this balanced relation to perception and responding, fronto-central P3 with auditory stimuli was stimulus-related and, for comparison, the peak amplitudes of both the response-force and of the lateralized readiness potential were response-related. We conclude that P3b reflects a process that mediates between perceptual analysis and response initiation, possibly monitoring whether the decision to classify some stimulus is appropriately transformed into action.

Three experiments were conducted to determine whether spatial stimulus-response compatibility effects are caused by automatic response activation by stimulus properties or by interference between codes during translation of stimulus into response coordinates. The main evidence against activation has been that in a Simon task with hands crossed, responses are faster at the response location ipsilateral to the stimulus though manipulated by the hand contralateral to the stimulus. The experiments were conducted with hands in standard and in crossed positions and electroencephalogram measures showed coactivation of the motor cortex induced by stimulus position primarily during standard hand positions with visual stimuli. Only in this condition did the Simon effect decay with longer response times. The visual Simon effect appeared to be due to specific mechanisms of visuomotor information transmission that are not responsible for the effects obtained with crossed hands or auditory stimuli.

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It has been recently proposed that the time course of the Simon effect may vary across tasks, which might reflect different types of stimulus-response (S-R) transmissions (E. Wascher, U. Schatz, T. Kuder, & R. Verleger, 2001). The authors tested this notion in 4 experiments by comparing Simon effects evoked by horizontal and vertical S-R arrangements. The temporal properties of the effect, as well as lateralized readiness potential-difference waves, indicated a fast and transient influence of the horizontal, but a slow and sustained influence of the vertical spatial stimulus feature on performance. Additional evidence for this temporal dissociation was obtained in experiments that induced a shortening or lengthening of the mean response time. Thus, the data strongly indicate that there are 2 temporally dissociable mechanisms involved in generating the Simon effect for horizontal and vertical S-R relations.

Abstract& Previous studies have shown that perceiving another's actions activates corresponding representations in an observer's action system. The present study investigated how performing a task with another person affects action planning and control. Reaction times (RTs) and event-related potentials were measured while participants performed a go/no-go task alone and with another person. Three effects of acting together were observed. First, RTs were slowed when individuals had to respond to a stimulus referring to the other's action, suggesting that an action selection conflict occurred. Second, at frontal sites, a stimulus referring to the other's action elicited a similar electrophysiological response as a stimulus referring to one's own action. Finally, on no-go trials, P300 amplitude was significantly larger in a group setting, indicating that an action was suppressed. These findings provide evidence that individuals acting in a social context form shared action representations. &

Human actions can be classified as being either more stimulus-based or more intention-based. According to the ideomotor framework of action control, intention-based actions primarily refer to anticipated action effects (in other words response-stimulus [R-S] bindings), whereas stimulus-based actions are commonly assumed to be more strongly determined by stimulus-response [S-R] bindings. We explored differences in the functional signatures of both modes of action control in a temporal bisection task. Participants either performed a choice response by pressing one out of two keys in response to a preceding stimulus (stimulus-based action), or pressed one out of two keys to produce the next stimulus (intention-based action). In line with the ideomotor framework, we found intention-based actions to be shifted in time towards their anticipated effects (the next stimulus), whereas stimulus-based actions were shifted towards their preceding stimulus. Event-related potentials (ERPs) in the EEG revealed marked differences in action preparation for the two tasks. The data as a whole provide converging evidence for functional differences in the selection of motor actions as a function of their triggering conditions, and support the notion of two different modes of action selection, one being exogenous or mainly stimulus-driven, the other being endogenous or mainly intention-driven.

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For the selection of relevant information out of a continuous stream of information, which is a common definition of attention, two core mechanisms are assumed: a competition-based comparison of the neuronal activity in sensory areas and the top-down modulation of this competition by frontal executive control functions. Those control functions are thought to bias the processing of information toward the intended goals. Acute stress is thought to impair these frontal functions through the release of cortisol. In the present study, subjects had to detect a luminance change of a stimulus and ignore more salient but task irrelevant orientation changes. Before the execution of this task, subjects underwent a socially evaluated cold pressor test (SECPT) or a non-stressful control situation. The SECPT revealed reliable stress response with a significant increase of cortisol and alpha-amylase. Stressed subjects showed higher error rates than controls, particularly in conditions which require top-down control processing to bias the less salient target feature against the more salient and spatially separated distracter. By means of the EEG, subjects who got stressed showed a reduced allocation to the relevant luminance change apparent in a modulation of the N1pc. The following N2pc, which reflects a re-allocation of attentional resources, supports the error pattern. There was only an N2pc in conditions, which required to bias the less salient luminance change. Moreover, this N2pc was decreased as a consequence of the induced stress. These results allow the conclusion that acute stress impairs the intention-based attentional allocation and enhances the stimulus-driven selection, leading to a strong distractibility during attentional information selection.