Determining Damages: The Psychology of Jury Awards is a comprehensive empirical analysis of the reasoning process behind jurors' complex task of deciding damage awards, and how those decision-making processes are sometimes impaired by the structural and procedural elements of civil jury trials. Greene (psychology, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs) and Bornstein (psychology and law, University of Nebraska) move seamlessly from the historical roots of damage awards, to concerns and critiques of jury damage awards, to potential system reforms. The book is divided into three sections that cover the influencing factors in damage assessment. The first section explores "The Issue of Identity" or the extra legal factors of how plaintiff, defendant and juror characteristics influence damage award decisions. The authors wade through the research and, not surprisingly, conclude that demographic factors have not proven to consistently relate to jury awards. Greene and Bornstein also note that factors like "locus of control" and "authoritarianism" that have been shown to matter in criminal cases have not proven to be as powerful of predictors in civil cases. What does seem to matter, however, is jurors' specific beliefs about the system of tort litigation. The beliefs and cognitions that have implications for one's life (e.g., "What is the likelihood that I will be sued?" "What will an award do to escalating insurance rates?") tend to predict damage award behavior better than beliefs that are not personally relevant.

Jury trials play a centrally important role in the law, and they are also of interest to psychologists. The manner in which individual jurors perceive, interpret, and remember evidence, as well as the group processes involved in jury deliberation, can be described in terms of fundamental cognitive and social psychological concepts. Juries provide a real-world laboratory for examining theoretical issues related to reasoning, memory, judgment and decision making, attribution, stereotyping, persuasion, and group behavior. Conversely, psychological research can inform trial procedures, enabling juries to benefit from fairer procedures and reach better outcomes. Thus, jury decision making has implications for psychological theory, and psychological research has implications for legal policy.

As the United States’ prison population has increased in size and aged, the number of older inmates in deteriorating health has grown markedly. In 1984, federal compassionate release laws were established, allowing for the release of inmates given “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” not present at sentencing. Many states established similar laws. Despite possible financial and ethical benefits of compassionate release, few inmates have been released under these laws. This research explored why. In Study 1, to assess the scope of this legislation, we provided a compendium of relevant laws, including information on jurisdictions with such laws, criteria for release outlined in each law, and exceptions that may preclude release. Results demonstrated that as of 2016, 46 jurisdictions had a compassionate release law in place. The most frequently cited criterion for release was having a chronic illness. In Study 2, to assess the possibility that public sentiment presents obstacles to using these statutes, we probed members of the public and prison wardens on perceptions of the laws, including factors (i.e., criminal history and offense type) associated with willingness to recommend release of a chronically ill inmate. Both community members and wardens were generally supportive of compassionate release, especially for nonviolent inmates and those with no criminal history. To explain why these statutes are underutilized, we comment on the complexity and diversity of mechanisms involved in correctional bureaucracies and propose a cost-benefit framework in which the risk of reoffending and loss of retributive opportunity outweigh pragmatic benefits of release on compassionate grounds.

Twice in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of life sentences without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders. Given the public nature of this issue, there is scant information on beliefs about imposing LWOP on juveniles. Attitudes on related issues suggest two possibilities. On the one hand, because public opinion regarding juvenile offenders has become somewhat less punitive recently, LWOP may be viewed as excessively harsh punishment. On the other hand, portrayal of some juvenile offenders as superpredators suggests that LWOP may still have public support. We used survey methodology and the unique "ninth justice paradigm" to examine how an offender's age influences beliefs about the appropriateness of LWOP, and the relationship between those beliefs and punishment-related ideologies. Results showed that, except in the case of murder, the majority of respondents disfavored imposing LWOP on juveniles, though a subset approved broad use of LWOP even for young offenders. In fact, after removing from consideration those who oppose LWOP under any circumstances, youthfulness of the offender has little impact on the beliefs about the types of crimes in which LWOP should be imposed (Study 1) or the mean sentence lengths imposed on juvenile offenders (Study 2). Respondents' punishment goals influenced their attitudes, as did beliefs about the likelihood of rehabilitation and reform. Harsh judgments of juveniles who commit serious crimes may result from dispositional attributions of youthful offenders as irredeemable.

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