Executive SummaryThe safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a "State-Level approach." The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and costefficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a(Bjornard, et al. , 2009b IAEA, 1998;Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) methodology introduced here supports SBD in three areas:1. It supports effective operator/designer engagement in the necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner/designer of a new or modified facility at the stages where the designer's SBD efforts can be applied most productively.2. It presents a screening tool intended to help the designer identify potential safeguard issues for a) design changes to existing facilities, b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with established IAEA safeguards approaches, and c) new designs.3. It provides a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools such as SBD good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods (called here the FSA toolkit). This toolkit can be used by the owner/designer to both identify potential safeguards issues and to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA.The majority of new facilities are expected to reflect modest design evolution from existing safeguarded facilities. Therefore, a major focus of the FSA process is efficiently assessing the impact of such an evolution in facility or process design upon required safeguards-related design features. The more a design evolves or differs from the design of similar-type facilities, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues will be introduced, and the more challenging SBD becomes. FSA can help the designer anticipate where new safeguards challenges are posed, and the size of the gap between established safeguards approaches and safeguards tools and measures at existing facilities of the same type and what the IAEA might require for the new design. For first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, comparison with previously required safeguard design features may not be sufficient. Accordingly, a comprehensive vulnerability or path assessment may be required to adequately identify and assess new safeg...
Technical activities to support licensing of dry spent nuclear fuel storage facilities are complex, with policy and regulatory requirements often being influenced by politics. Moreover, the process is often convoluted, with numerous and diverse stakeholders making the licensing activity a difficult exercise in consensus-reaching. The objective of this evaluation is to present alternatives to assist the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) in developing a licensing approach for a planned Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility. Because the RK lacks experience in licensing a facility of this type, there is considerable interest in knowing more about the approval process in other countries so that an effective, non-redundant method of licensing can be established. This evaluation is limited to a comparison of approaches from the United States, Germany, Russia, and Canada. For each country considered, the following areas were addressed: siting; fuel handling and cask loading; dry fuel storage; and transportation of spent fuel. The regulatory requirements for each phase of the process are presented, and a licensing approach that would best serve the RK is recommended.
The purpose of this study was to: 1) identify alternative institutional arrangements applicable to the sensitive steps in the back-end of the fuel cycle that might reduce their associated proliferation risks; and 2) assess their advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of nonproliferation effectiveness and political , economic , and operational acceptability. The concept of international or multinational custody of sensitive materials and facilities was found to offer a high degree of proliferation resistance and to likely be more acceptable to prospective participants than other institutional arrangements that intrude upon proprietary areas , such as facility ownership and management.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.