We consider a production quota buyout that is paid for by a consumption tax. If producers are paid the true value of the quota via a consumption tax, the net producer gain is zero for the combined introduction and removal of quota (even though the quota value is positive) since the net gain to producers when the quota was introduced is equal to the net loss to producers when the production quota is removed. Therefore, the quota value does not measure the producer net gain from both the introduction and removal of the production quota. The quota value merely represents the consumption tax amount. This is also true if producers are paid (which is often the case) an inflated quota value that is more than the true quota value.

When policies are changed, it is not uncommon for losers to be compensated. Economic theory and quantitative analysis are useful in determining the efficiency gains/losses associated with a policy change, but are little help in deciding what the approach to compensation should be. The amount of compensation varies, depending on, in part, the political clout of the parties being negatively affected by a policy change—compensation is what politicians and the sector demanding compensation can agree on. We formulate four approaches to producer compensation within the context of the Ontario Tobacco Transition Program, where producers would have suffered losses in the absence of compensation. The approaches range from providing zero compensation to providing compensation based on the entire value of the tobacco quota. The Canadian government chose the latter and compensated producers for the termination of the tobacco quota program based on an approach that far exceeded other possible compensation approaches.

Abstract:We provide a theoretical and empirical comparison of two historic production quota buyouts: the 2002 US Peanut Quota Buyout and the 2004 US Tobacco Quota Buyout. Producer compensation under the US Peanut Quota Buyout came from the treasury while the US Tobacco Buyout was paid for by a consumer tax (i.e., tobacco tax). Given these two buyouts, an important question arises: How does the method of compensation affect distribution and efficiency? Producers, consumers, and society favor a treasury buyout (TB) for several reasons. Producers are compensated considerably more under a TB, consumers are not burdened with the charge of funding the buyout, and society does not face additional efficiency losses due to the buyout.

This article analyzes the impact of removing the U.S. tobacco program in both a partial and general welfare economics framework. In a partial-equilibrium framework, a consumer tax-funded quota buyout can result in producer gains, consumer losses, net losses resulting from higher prices, and deadweight losses. In a general-equilibrium framework, society can gain from the buyout resulting from considerable potential savings from reduced healthcare costs attributable to a reduction in smoking. Additionally, we present a model that addresses the addictive qualities of tobacco while considering the effects of the quota buyout. We also conclude that another possible effect of the buyout is an increase in worker productivity because employees who are able to quit smoking reduce the amount of smoking-related sick days taken.

This article updates and expands the literature on the impact of production quotas. Unlike many of the early studies, our focus is largely on the removal of production quota programs. We study cases wherein production quota programs have been eliminated and quota owners were compensated for their losses. Specifically, we examine (1) production quotas in both the absence and presence of trade, (2) production quota buyouts (three case studies), (3) sources of funding, and (4) general equilibrium considerations. A fifth section briefly discusses externalities, the interpretation of consumer surplus measures, and the nature of conducting economic analyses of addictive goods.