This study examined the effect of the "TrEAT Yourself Well" campaign on diners'menu choices using data from four restaurant chains in California. Within each chain, two locations in the greater San Diego area were selected as experimental sites and either one or two locations outside the greater San Diego area were selected as control sites. Various promotional activities, including in-restaurant promotions, community events, and paid media advertising, were conducted in the experimental region to promote healthy menu entrées. The results show that the campaign was successful in reaching diners and had positive effects on their beliefs and attitudes toward healthy dining. The campaign directly increased the probability of a consumer purchasing a healthy menu item by 3.7% (p = .05). By improving consumer attitudes toward healthy menu items, the campaign indirectly increased purchases of these items by 4.4%.

The sharp rise in energy prices in the 1980s triggered a strong interest in the production of ethanol as an additional energy component. Economists are divided as to the payoffs from ethanol derived corn in part because of the complex interrelationship between energy produced from ethanol and energy from fossil fuels. Using a welfare economic framework, we calculate that there can be treasury savings from ethanol using tax credits as these subsidies can be smaller than direct payments to corn farmers which are essentially eliminated from the expansion of ethanol. Also, to the extent that ethanol dampens fuel prices there can be a net welfare gain from ethanol production in the presence of ethanol subsidies.

Input subsidies are common in North American agriculture and create production and trade distortions. As the theoretical discussion in this paper shows, the Crow transportation subsidy was no exception. The Crow benefit was eliminated in 1996 with the elimination of the Western Grain Transportation Act. Under the “pay the producer” approach, farmers in western Canada were compensated for the removal of the Crow subsidy, but the compensation was nowhere near that required to make grain and oilseed producers in western Canada at least as well off as before the Crow subsidy was removed. This policy change satisfied the compensation principle but not the Pareto principle. Reasons are given why this was the case, including very divergent views from various farm groups such as the National Farmers Union, the Alberta Cattle Commission, and the Alberta Barley Growers Association. Les intrants du secteur agricole sont souvent subventionnés en Amérique du Nord, ce qui fausse la production et les échanges. Comme l'illustre la discussion dans cet article, il en a été ainsi pour le tarif du Pas‐du‐Nid‐du‐Corbeau, dans les transports. Cette subvention a été abolie en 1996 avec l'abrogation de Loi sur le transport du grain de l'Ouest. Les producteurs de céréales et d'oléagineux de l'Ouest canadien ont été indemnisés, mais la somme qui leur a été versée était largement insuffisante pour qu'ils restent aussi bien lotis qu'avant l'abolition de la subvention. La nouvelle politique a satisfait le principe de la compensation, mais pas celui de Pareto. On explique le pourquoi de cette situation, l'une des raisons étant les points de vue tràs divergents de diverses associations agricoles.

Benefit-cost (B/C) analysis must take into account the distributional effects from a policy or program change. To highlight this, we focus on the theory of production quota buyouts within a B/C framework. As an empirical application, we provide evidence on the distributional effects of the U.S. government buyout of the peanut program in 2002, where production quotas were key ingredients. Two approaches to producer compensation under the buyout are discussed: (1) value of quota approach and (2) gains from quota approach. In the peanut quota program buyout, the U.S. government chose the value of quota approach. Both consumers and producers were made better off as a result of the buyout, and there was a net gain in efficiency. If the government had chosen the gains from quota approach instead, government expenditures and producer gains would have been lower, and consumer benefits would have remained unchanged. Under either approach, the B/C ratios calculated for the government quota buyout are almost identical. KEYWORDS:benefit-cost analysis, distributional effects, production quota buyouts, U.S., peanut quota program, value of quota approach, gains from quota approach

The discovery of StarLink corn in U.S. food products caused considerable disruption in corn markets in 2000 and 2001. Segregation costs were incurred by the U.S. grain-handling system in order to ensure that domestic and export sales of food corn and export sales of non-food corn to Japan meet stringent tolerance levels. These costs reduced the revenue that U.S. corn producers would have received in the absence of StarLink. However, the Loan Deficiency Payment Program (LDP) effectively reduced the loss in revenue attributed to StarLink. This study develops a partial equilibrium model that encompasses both segregation costs and the LDP program in order to obtain empirical estimates of the impact of StarLink on U.S. corn producers over the 2000|2001 marketing year. It is estimated that StarLink caused U.S. producers to lose between $26 and $288 million in revenue. [EconLit citations: Q18, Q17, L51.] © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 21: 391-407, 2005.