Person perception includes three sequential processes: categorization (what is the actor doing?), characterization (what trait does the action Imply?), and correction (what situation*! constraints may have caused the action?). We argue that correction is less automatic (i.e., more easily disrupted) than either categorization or characterization. In Experiment l, subjects observed a target behave anxiously in an anxiety-provoking situation. In Experiment 2, subjects listened to a target read a political speech that he had been constrained to write. In both experiments, control subjects used information about situational constraints when drawing inferences about the target, but cognitively busy subjects (who performed an additional cognitive task during encoding) did not. The results (a) suggest that person perception is a combination of lower and higher order processes that differ in their susceptibility to disruption and (b) highlight the fundamental differences between active and passive perceivers.Many of us can recall a time when, as students, we encountered a professor at a party and were surprised to find that he or she seemed a very different sort of person than our classroom experience had led us to expect. In part, such discrepant impressions reflect real discrepancies in behavior: Professors may display greater warmth or less wit at a party than they do in the classroom. However, just as the object of perception changes across situations, so too does the perceiver. As passive perceivers in a classroom, we are able to observe a professor without concerning ourselves with the mechanics of social interaction. At a party, however, we are active perceivers, busy managing our impressions, predicting our partner's behavior, and evaluating alternative courses of action. Of all the many differences between active and passive perceivers, one seems fundamental: Active perceivers, unlike passive perceivers, are almost always doing several things at once (Gilbert,

Spinoza suggested that all information is accepted during comprehension and that false information is then unaccepted. Subjects were presented with true and false linguistic propositions and, on some trials, their processing of that information was interrupted. As Spinoza's model predicted, interruption increased the likelihood that subjects would consider false propositions true but not vice versa (Study 1). This was so even when the proposition was iconic and when its veracity was revealed before its comprehension (Study 2). In fact, merely comprehending a false proposition increased the likelihood that subjects would later consider it true (Study 3). The results suggest that both true and false information are initially represented as true and that people are not easily able to alter this method of representation. Results are discussed in terms of contemporary research on attribution, lie detection, hypothesis testing, and attitude change.

Three studies asked why people sometimes seek positive feedback (self-enhance) and sometimes seek subjectively accurate feedback (self-verify). Consistent with self-enhancement theory, people with low self-esteem as well as those with high self-esteem indicated that they preferred feedback pertaining to their positive rather than negative self-views. Consistent with self-verification theory, the very people who sought favorable feedback pertaining to their positive self-conceptions sought unfavorable feedback pertaining to their negative self-views, regardless of their level of global self-esteem. Apparently, although all people prefer to seek feedback regarding their positive self-views, when they seek feedback regarding their negative self-views, they seek unfavorable feedback. Whether people self-enhance or self-verify thus seems to be determined by the positivity of the relevant self-conceptions rather than their level of self-esteem or the type of person they are. You will find that the truth is often unpopular and the contest between agreeable fancy and disagreeable fact is unequal. For, in the vernacular, we Americans are all suckers for good news. (Stevenson, 1958, p. 17) Man's passion for truth is such that he will welcome the bitterest of all postulates so long as it strikes him as true. (Machado, 1963, P. 2) People like good news, especially when it is about them. This point has not been lost on behavioral scientists, who have proposed that there is a fundamental human tendency for people to seek positive or self-enhancing feedback. Yet it also seems clear that people possess a "passion for truth." Recognition of this sentiment has led theorists to propose that people are motivated to seek subjectively accurate or self-verifying feedback. A major purpose of this article is to consider how these sometimes conflicting motives interact to control behavior. We begin with a brief discussion of each. Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification One of psychology's most venerable ideas is that people like to hear good things about themselves. For example, McDougall (1933) referred to the principle of self-regard as the "master motive," Koffka (1935) gave special status to the "force which

We propose that people with negative self-views are rejected because they gravitate to partners who view them unfavorably. In relation to nondepressed college students (n = 28), depressives (n = 13) preferred interaction partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 1). Similarly, in relation to nondepressives (n = 106), depressives (n = 10) preferred friends or dating partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 2). Dysphorics (n = 6) were more inclined to seek unfavorable feedback from their roommates than were nondepressives (n = 16); feedback-seeking activities of dysphorics were also associated with later rejection (Study 3). Finally, people with negative self-views (n = 37) preferentially solicited unfavorable feedback, although receiving such feedback made them unhappy, in comparison with people with positive self-views (n = 42; Study 4). It seems a desire for self-verification compels people with negative self-views to seek unfavorable appraisals.

No abstract

Previous research suggests that perceives estimate the cause of behavior by (a) identifying the behavior (b) inferring the actor's disposition from the behavior, and (c) correcting this inference for situational constraints. An experiment investigated whether perceivers' inferential goals alter this process. Perceivers viewed a silent videotape of an anxious interview. Some perceivers estimated the target's dispositional anxiety; others estimated the degree of anxiety provoked by the interview questions. Within these conditions, half simultaneously performed a cognitive rehearsal task. Of perceivers who estimated the target's dispositional anxiety, those who performed the rehearsal task inferred more dispositional anxiety. In contrast, of perceivers who estimated the anxiety provoked by the questions, those who performed the rehearsal task inferred less dispositional anxiety. These findings suggest that social inference is more flexible than previously thought.

How do attempts to regulate one's own behavior affect the inferences one draws about others? We suggest that perceivers draw dispositional inferences about targets (characterization) and then adjust those inferences with information about the constraints on the targets' behaviors (correction). Because correction is more effortful than characterization, perceivers who devote cognitive resources to the regulation of their own behavior should be able to characterize targets but unable to correct those characterizations. In Experiment 1, unregulated subjects incidentally ignored an irrelevant stimulus while they observed a target's behavior, whereas self-regulated subjects purposefully ignored the same irrelevant stimulus. In Experiment 2, unregulated subjects expressed their sincere affection toward a target, whereas self-regulated subjects expressed false affection. In both experiments, self-regulated subjects were less likely than unregulated subjects to correct their characterizations of the target. The results suggest that social interaction (which generally requires the selfregulation of ongoing behavior) may profoundly affect the way in which active perceivers process information about others.Lying is not only excusable; it is not only innocent, and ins tinctive; it is, above all, necessary and unavoidable. Without the ameliorations that it offers life would become a mere syllogism, and hence too metallic to be borne. ( H. L. Mencken, 1924 , p. 277) What would social life be like if people invariably said what they meant and meant what they said? A mere syllogism indeed: tractable, uncomplicated, and obvious. However, social life is none of these things because people are in fact quite capable of crafting behaviors that are imperfect indexes of their inner beliefs. When people make polite conversation with a contemptible colleague, mask their desire for an attractive acquaintance, or feign interest in a friend's dreary problems, they are striking a thoughtful balance between the expression and inhibition of their true feelings. The self-regulation of overt behavior is the kingpin on which virtually all social interactions turn.

A growing body of research suggests that cultures differ in the tendency to prefer dispositional or situational explanations for behavior. However, little work has examined whether cultural differences exist in the tendency to infer that people’s dispositions correspond to their behavior (the correspondence bias). Two experiments, one using the attitude attribution paradigm and one using the quizmaster paradigm, investigated the correspondence bias in individualist and collectivist cultures. As predicted, significant correspondence bias effects were found in both cultures. Moreover, no cultural difference emerged. Explanations and implications are discussed.