Unbelieving the unbelievable: Some problems in the rejection of false information.

Abstract

Spinoza suggested that all information is accepted during comprehension and that false information is then unaccepted. Subjects were presented with true and false linguistic propositions and, on some trials, their processing of that information was interrupted. As Spinoza's model predicted, interruption increased the likelihood that subjects would consider false propositions true but not vice versa (Study 1). This was so even when the proposition was iconic and when its veracity was revealed before its comprehension (Study 2). In fact, merely comprehending a false proposition increased the likelihood that subjects would later consider it true (Study 3). The results suggest that both true and false information are initially represented as true and that people are not easily able to alter this method of representation. Results are discussed in terms of contemporary research on attribution, lie detection, hypothesis testing, and attitude change.

Lying relies on the truth

“…An extra step would then be required to falsify this initial belief if it is not in line with the actual truth. The idea of "truth bias" has been supported in studies using verification tasks, by showing that participants are faster to verify that a proposition is true than to verify it is false (Clark & Chase, 1972;Gilbert, Krull, Malone, 1990). Whereas the concept of truth bias refers to how information is understood by the receiver (i.e., initial default assumption is that information is true), the two-step hypothesis of lying deals with how deceptive information is conveyed by the sender (i.e., first determine the truth in order to afterwards communicate the lie).…”

The negation bias: When negations signal stereotypic expectancies.

“…After all, why should one deny something unless this was in fact a possibility? The denial of criminality then (e.g., P is not a criminal) may itself prove incriminating (Wegner, et al, 1981;Wegner, Coulton & Wenzlaff, 1985; for related evidence see Christie et al 2001;Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993;Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990;Grant, Malaviya, Sternthal, 2004;Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006;Kaup, Ludtke & Zwaan, 2006;Paradis &Willners, 2006). These findings demonstrate the consequences of using The negation bias 39 negations, rather than affirmations, in person description, and highlight the importance of the negation bias.…”

How Warnings about False Claims Become Recommendations

“…This effect occurs even for statements that are explicitly identified as false on initial presentation (Begg, Anas, and Farinacci 1992;Gilbert, Krull, and Malone 1990). One interpretation of this effect is that it comes from a constructive inference that people make when they have little information with which to judge the truth of a claim other than the realization that they have seen it before.…”

“…According to the "Spinozan processor" explanation (Gilbert et al 1990), people automatically encode all new information as true, if only for a moment. People can change this default representation to false only by engaging a subsequent effort-dependent mechanism through which they attach a false "tag" to the representation.…”

“…The Spinozan account predicts a main effect of repetition over time. Repeatedly identifying a claim as false should increase the chances that a false tag will be attached to the claim's representation, which will decrease the chances of misremembering the claim as true (Gilbert et al 1990). Hence false claims that are presented several times should be remembered more accurately after both short and long delays, compared to false claims presented once.…”