This paper uses technical efficiency to measure the performance impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, it analyzes how the size, leadership and composition of the board of directors together with external shareholders can be structured to enhance a firm's technical efficiency. The study utilizes an unbalanced pool of manufacturing firms in sixteen countries and offers support that active large external shareholders' who commit credible signals to minority investors of firms that have an insider-dominated or balanced small board with a unified leadership can lead to enhanced technical efficiency. The results also provide evidence of the convergence of American and European corporate governance practices. External shareholders are also encouraged to elect an outsider-dominated board when insiders underperform, and not on blind normative advice.
The real estate sector keeps contributing significantly to the Spanish economy. A recent news article reports the existence of inefficiencies in the nature and delivery of new properties. We investigate the technical efficiency of this sector using a non-parametric “reasonable” benchmarking frontier, acknowledging the marked influence of the sector’s shadow economy. We then relate the results applying a panel data analysis to the shareholding concentration and identity of firm ownership. We find no systematic support for the effect of corporate ownership on technical efficiency
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