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Given their lack of background knowledge, laypeople require expert help when dealing with scientific information. To decide whose help is dependable, laypeople must judge an expert’s epistemic trustworthiness in terms of competence, adherence to scientific standards, and good intentions. Online, this may be difficult due to the often limited and sometimes unreliable source information available. To measure laypeople’s evaluations of experts (encountered online), we constructed an inventory to assess epistemic trustworthiness on the dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence. Exploratory (n = 237) and confirmatory factor analyses (n = 345) showed that the Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI) is composed of these three factors. A subsequent experimental study (n = 137) showed that all three dimensions of the METI are sensitive to variation in source characteristics. We propose using this inventory to measure assignments of epistemic trustworthiness, that is, all judgments laypeople make when deciding whether to place epistemic trust in–and defer to–an expert in order to solve a scientific informational problem that is beyond their understanding.

This study indicates the possibility of changing domain-specific epistemological beliefs through a short-term intervention. However, it questions the stability and elaborateness of domain-specific epistemological beliefs, particularly when domain knowledge is shallow.

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In methodological and practical debates about replications in science, it is (often implicitly) assumed that replications will affect public trust in science. In this preregistered experiment ( N = 484), we varied (a) whether a replication attempt was successful or not and (b) whether the replication was authored by the same, or another lab. Results showed that ratings of study credibility (e.g. evidence strength, ηP2 = .15) and researcher trustworthiness (e.g. expertise, ηP2 = .15) were rated higher upon learning of replication success, and lower in case of replication failure. The replication’s author did not make a meaningful difference. Prior beliefs acted as covariate for ratings of credibility, but not trustworthiness, while epistemic beliefs regarding the certainty of knowledge were a covariate to both. Hence, laypeople seem to notice that successfully replicated results entail higher epistemic significance, while possibly not taking into account that replications should be conducted by other labs.