In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers' compliance and a natural inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed "citizenship". The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially known to agents. The agent-based model is simulated under a variety of settings, representing different "societies". We use the artificial data produced by the model to estimate the effects of taxpayers' traits on personal tax behavior and to build a compliance societal slippery slope. At the individual level, we find a positive dependence of compliance on all variables, with the significant exception of the tax rate, which has a negative impact. As far as societies are concerned, we show how aggregate tax compliance depends on composite indices of citizenship and power, and we find that the former is more important than the latter.
The paper estimates the extent of evasion of personal income tax (PIT) in Italy by integrating two methods that the literature has previously applied separately. The consumption‐based method introduced by Pissarides and Weber (1989) is used to estimate misreporting of income in micro data collected in the household IT‐SILC survey. We adopt an econometric specification close in spirit to that of Feldman and Slemrod (2007), which allows us to estimate income misreporting at different rates for different income sources. The misreporting estimates are then used in the discrepancy method to correct the incomes compared with administrative registered data. The comparison provides new estimates of evasion of personal income tax by type of income, region and income class. The estimates are used to improve microsimulation analyses of the distributional impact of tax evasion.
In several countries, personal income tax permits tax credits for out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure. Tax credits benefit taxpayers at all income levels by reducing their net tax liability and modify the price of out-of-pocket expenditure. To the extent that consumer demand is price elastic, they may influence the amount of eligible healthcare expenditure for which taxpayers may claim a credit. These effects influence, in turn, income distributions and taxpayers' health status and therefore income-related inequality in health. Redistributive consequences of tax credits have been widely investigated. However, little is known about the ability of tax credits to alleviate health inequality. In this paper, we study the potential effects that tax credits for health expenses may have on income-related inequality in health status with reference to the Italian institutional setting. The analysis is performed using a tax-benefit microsimulation model that reproduces the personal income tax and incorporates taxpayers' behavioral responses to changes in tax credit rate. Our results suggest that the current healthcare tax credit design tends to favor the richest part of the population.
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