I propose the concept of “ignoring” to capture situations in which government officials appear dismissive (either through inaction or contempt) of popular mobilization. The concept refers not only to actions by regime officials but also captures protesters' perceptions of those actions. Examples of ignoring include not communicating with protesters, issuing condescending statements, physically evading protesters, or acting with contempt toward popular mobilization. Existing conceptual tools do not adequately capture these dynamics. Although repression and concessions have been extensively theorized, scholars lack conceptual tools to understand responses that fall short of both repression and concessions. I introduce the concept of “ignoring” as a useful tool to focus on a subset of actions on the part of regime officials who are the targets of mobilization, with discernible consequences for subsequent mobilization. Drawing on research on the role of emotions in protest politics and on framing and social movements, I argue that ignoring protests can trigger emotional responses that encourage people to engage in protest, such as anger, indignation, and outrage. By integrating protesters' perceptions of the behavior of the targets of mobilization, not just of the security forces, the concept of “ignoring” helps explain protesters' reactions and their future mobilization, in a way that conventional concepts such as tolerance cannot capture. This analysis has important implications for broader theoretical debates on the relationship between regime response to protests and subsequent mobilization. Most importantly, it urges scholars to consider how ignoring can interact with other responses to mobilization, thereby altering the dynamics of the infamous the “concession-repression dilemma.” I use evidence from workers' protests in late Mubarak Egypt to illustrate these dynamics.

Though there are many expectations regarding the interim character of the current political order, the future of Egyptian democracy remains highly uncertain. A closer look at the take-over of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is imperative to an understanding of a political system at a decisive crossroads, but also of the path-dependent implications of the military’s engagement in politics. We project that, irrespective of the institutional framing and the results of the current political transformation, the military will play a decisive role in the country’s political future. In addressing its role during the current revolutionary events, we account for the reason for the military’s engagement in politics, the path of the take-over of political power, and the military’s management of politics. Thus, our analysis will attempt to provide preliminary answers to three questions: When and how did the Egyptian military intervene directly in revolutionary politics? Why did it intervene? And how does it manage the transformation?

The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) emerged as a major player in the country's transition from authoritarianism. Existing explanations - focusing on authoritarian legacies, the degree of trade union autonomy from the state, and labor's material incentives to support democratization - do not sufficiently account for the high-profile nature of the union's political role in Tunisia's transition. Instead, as this article argues, the importance of unions' pre-authoritarian legacy is key to understanding the role of unions in the transition from authoritarian rule. If unions enter the regime formation stage with a history of political struggle and with strong organizational capacities, they are more likely to develop a degree of internal autonomy that makes it difficult for authoritarian incumbents to disempower them. The article employs a historical institutional approach and draws on fieldwork and interviews with labor activists in Tunisia.

Why did unemployed university graduates form collective associations in some countries in the Middle East and North Africa but not in others? Despite similar levels of grievances around educated unemployment, reversals in guaranteed employment schemes, and similarly restrictive conditions for mobilization, unemployed graduates’ associations formed in Morocco and Tunisia but not in Egypt. Conventional explanations—focused on grievances, political opportunities, or pre-existing organizational structures—cannot account for this variation. Instead, I point to the power of ideologically conducive frames for mobilization around the time that grievances become salient. A strong Leftist oriented tradition of student unionism in Morocco and Tunisia was necessary for the emergence of a rights-based discourse around the “right to work.” This was not the case in Egypt, where Islamists, not Communists, dominated student politics at the time that grievances around educated unemployment became salient. This article offers one of the first comparative studies of the mobilization of the unemployed in a non-Western, non-democratic context.

How do social movements sustain themselves under authoritarian rule? This remains a crucial puzzle for scholars of comparative politics. This article gains traction on this puzzle by foregrounding the generative power of protest, namely the power of protest experiences themselves to deepen and broaden movements. Some studies have started to draw attention to those questions without yet systematically examining how the form of protest differentially affects those outcomes. I argue that different forms of protest have varying effects on movements depending on their duration and geographic scope. While short, multiple-site actions, such as marches, can broaden movements by expanding their base, extended, single-site actions, such as sit-ins, are more likely to deepen movements by fostering collective identities and building organizational capacities. This article is based on field research in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco and interviews with more than 100 movement participants and civil society activists.

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Under what conditions do trade unions participate in elections during democratic transitions? Conventional explanations focus on unions’ economic interests, organizational power, and militancy in the lead-up to democratization. The behavior of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), however, challenges these expectations. Despite its organizational strength and prominent role in the country’s transition, as well as the presence of economic incentives for participation, the UGTT has eschewed formal electoral participation. This article leverages this case to theorize an additional factor shaping electoral behavior: internal cohesion. Drawing on in-depth interviews with union leaders and original survey data of union members, we show how the threat of internal fragmentation acts as a powerful internal constraint, even in situations where unions are otherwise well-positioned to engage in elections.