2011
DOI: 10.1163/187633711x591396
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Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt

Abstract: Though there are many expectations regarding the interim character of the current political order, the future of Egyptian democracy remains highly uncertain. A closer look at the take-over of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is imperative to an understanding of a political system at a decisive crossroads, but also of the path-dependent implications of the military’s engagement in politics. We project that, irrespective of the institutional framing and the results of the current political… Show more

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Cited by 57 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…The heart of these accords consisted of a bargain (Quandt, 1988;Telhami, 1992) in which the Egyptian military agreed to exchange wars abroad for business and development activities at home (Albrecht and Bishara, 2011;Safty, 1991). Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt's military reidentified as a technocratic and entrepreneurial group of development contractors, launching infrastructure projects, and utilizing their combat training only in the context of limited peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Frisch, 2001;Gotowicki, 1997).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The heart of these accords consisted of a bargain (Quandt, 1988;Telhami, 1992) in which the Egyptian military agreed to exchange wars abroad for business and development activities at home (Albrecht and Bishara, 2011;Safty, 1991). Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt's military reidentified as a technocratic and entrepreneurial group of development contractors, launching infrastructure projects, and utilizing their combat training only in the context of limited peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Frisch, 2001;Gotowicki, 1997).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Every Egyptian president had been drawn from the officer corps, 65 and no matter the efforts to contain its influence, 66 the military continued to exercise veto power in policymaking. 67 Egypt's geostrategic position as a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict conferred perpetual stature on the Egyptian military. So did the military's success in delivering on large infrastructural and development projects.…”
Section: Institutional Legacymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Egypt, with the destruction of other political institutions (where the military had thrived over the years), the military was left as the only institution to maintain political order (Karawan 2011). However, the Egyptian military did not show awareness of the responsibility it had to take on to lead in political governance, and this was clear in its lack of transparency or constitutional amendments to prepare for new democratic elections (Albrecht & Bishara 2011).…”
Section: Politicized Armies: Africa and Beyondmentioning
confidence: 99%