The use of the categories 'refugee' and 'migrant' to differentiate between those on the move and the legitimacy, or otherwise, of their claims to international protection has featured strongly during Europe's 'migration crisis' and has been used to justify policies of exclusion and containment. Drawing on interviews with 215 people who crossed the Mediterranean to Greece in 2015, our paper challenges this 'categorical fetishism', arguing that the dominant categories fail to capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic drivers of migration or their shifting significance for individuals over time and space. As such it builds upon a substantial body of academic literature demonstrating a disjuncture between conceptual and policy categories and the lived experiences of those on the move. However, the paper is also critical of efforts to foreground or privilege 'refugees' over 'migrants' arguing that this reinforces rather than challenges the dichotomy's faulty foundations. Rather those concerned about the use of categories to marginalise and exclude should explicitly engage with the politics of bounding, that is to say, the process by which categories are constructed, the purpose they serve and their consequences, in order to denaturalise their use as a mechanism to distinguish, divide and discriminate.

Illiberal practices of liberal regimes have been extensively studied by critical security studies. The literature on risk emphasises the idea of imminent dangers and the logic of worst-case scenarios, which eventually unsettle the balance between security and liberty by always favouring the former in its most coercive and exceptional forms. This paper, by drawing on (in)securitization theory, attempts to explain how particular illiberal practices with respect to the control and management of immigration on the fringe of the EU become normalised. It argues that (in)securitization of immigration and illiberal practices are effects of the very functioning of a transnational field of (in)security professionals that are produced through the structural competition between different actors of this field over the definition of security and the appropriate control and management of immigration. In this respect, it uses Greece as a case study and draws on material gathered through interviews with Greek security professionals in Athens, Lesvos, Orestiada, and Alexandroupoli, and analysis of their discourse in dissertations they prepared during their study in police academies.

It has been commonly argued that amid the so-called 'migration crisis' in 2015, Greece ignored its Dublin Regulation obligations due to unprecedentedly high migration flows, structural weaknesses, fears and uncertainty. However, this narrative deprives the Greek government of agency. In contrast, this article puts forward an alternative analysis of Greece's attitude. It argues that the Greek government's policy choices in the realms of border controls, migration and asylum in 2015, prior to the 'EU-Turkey deal', manifested a well-calculated desecuritisation strategy with a twofold aim. In this respect, this article provides an analysis of why and how the newly elected SYRIZA-led coalition government embarked on a desecuritising move and assesses the success/effectiveness of this move and the desecuritisation strategy. It argues that although the government's desecuritising move was successful, overall, its desecuritisation strategy failed to produce the anticipated results vis-à-vis the government's twofold aim and intended outcomes.

This article explores the experiences of young Syrian refugees in the UK. It looks at how settlement plays out for two 'types' of Syrian refugees, those resettled by the UK Government and those who claim asylum in the UK. Drawing on new empirical data from 484 Syrian refugees in the UK, the article compares and contrasts the two groups' access to educational provisions, the labour market and general support mechanisms that should, in principle, be equally available to all refugees. This reveals the scale and consequences of the existing two-tier system of international protection based entirely on how refugees come to be in the UK, rather than any objective analysis of their reason for flight. In doing so, the article seeks to contribute to debates about the process and implications of how host states label people, in this case by de facto treating resettled Syrians as the 'good' refugees, while those who arrive of their own volition, regardless of their needs, are viewed as more problematic.