This article reviews research on the effects of economic recessions on fertility in the developed world. We study how economic downturns, as measured by various indicators, especially by declining GDP levels, falling consumer confidence, and rising unemployment, were found to affect fertility. We also discuss particular mechanisms through which the recession may have influenced fertility behavior, including the effects of economic uncertainty, falling income, changes in the housing market, and rising enrollment in higher education, and also factors that influence fertility indirectly such as declining marriage rates. Most studies find that fertility tends to be pro-cyclical and often rises and declines with the ups and downs of the business cycle. Usually, these aggregate effects are relatively small (typically, a few percentage points) and of short durations; in addition they often influence especially the timing of childbearing and in most cases do not leave an imprint on cohort fertility levels. Therefore, major long-term fertility shifts often continue seemingly uninterrupted during the recession—including the fertility declines before and during the Great Depression of the 1930s and before and during the oil shock crises of the 1970s. Changes in the opportunity costs of childbearing and fertility behavior during economic downturn vary by sex, age, social status, and number of children; childless young adults are usually most affected. Furthermore, various policies and institutions may modify or even reverse the relationship between recessions and fertility. The first evidence pertaining to the recent recession falls in line with these findings. In most countries, the recession has brought a decline in the number of births and fertility rates, often marking a sharp halt to the previous decade of rising fertility rates.

In this article, we study fertility decision-making through timing parity-progression intentions. The theoretical framework builds on Ajzen's socialpsychological ''Theory of Planned Behavior'': intentions are seen as directly dependent on three components: attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control. We study the case of Bulgaria, a ''lowest-low'' fertility country. In 2002, a sample survey containing a specially designed module was conducted. This module included an implementation of our framework, with a special attention to the links between normative pressure and the social network of respondents. Results show that the three components are broadly predictive of fertility intentions. More specifically, attitudes are more relevant than norms for higher parities. Socio-economic, ideational, psychological and social capital-based factors are relevant background determinants.Keywords Fertility intentions Á Theory of planned behavior Á Bulgaria Á Lowest-low fertility Á Norms Résumé Dans cet article, nous étudions les décisions en matière de fécondité à l'aide des intentions d'agrandissement avec référence temporelle. Le cadre conceptuel est celui de la théorie psychosociologique du comportement prévu d'Ajzen, selon laquelle les intentions dépendent de façon directe de trois éléments : les attitudes, les normes et le contrôle perçu du comportement. L'étude concerne la Bulgarie, un pays dont la fécondité est des plus basses. En 2002, une enquête par sondage comportant un module de questions construit à cette fin a été menée. Ce 123Eur J Population (2009( ) 25:439-465 DOI 10.1007 module comprenait les éléments pour mettre en oeuvre notre cadre conceptuel, en accordant une attention particulière aux liens entre la pression normative et le réseau social des enquêtés. Les résultats montrent que les trois éléments de la théorie sont des facteurs de prédiction des intentions de fécondité. Plus spécifiquement, les attitudes sont plus pertinentes que les normes pour le passage au deuxième enfant. Les facteurs socio-économiques, idéationnels, psychologiques et ceux basés sur le capital social sont pertinents comme déterminants de contexte.

In the paper we analyse the leaving-home experience of men and women born around 1960 in 16 European countries. We use extensive empirical evidence from Fertility and Family Survey data, providing a largescale comparison. We focus on some key indicators of the process of leaving home: the timing, sequencing and synchronisation of leaving home with the end of education and the formation of a ®rst union. As far as these dimensions of leaving home are concerned, Europe appears to be extremely heterogeneous, and explaining this will undoubtedly be a challenge. The complex interplay between the present economic situation of young people and long-term institutional and cultural factors is thought to be the main driving factor. Our ®ndings constitute a benchmark against which subsequent behaviour, such as that of cohorts coming of age after the fall of the Iron Curtain, could be compared.

We use survey data from Bulgaria and Hungary to investigate the determinants of whether women intend to have a first or a second child and, if so, whether they intend to have the child within the ensuing 2 years or later. These determinants differ significantly by the order and timing of the intended birth. The variables used include measures of anomie and social capital and these appear to be among the factors that determine both whether to have a child and when. There is some evidence that these measures and economic factors are relatively more important in Bulgaria than in Hungary, and that ideational factors are more important in Hungary, particularly in the case of voluntary childlessness.

In this study, we present a system of descriptions of family-demographic behavior in developed countries. We use life-table techniques in order to describe the experience of men, of women, and of children in processes related to family formation and family dissolution. We develop a large number of descriptive measures, and apply them to survey data from Sweden,