This paper discusses whether the effect of campaign‐style enforcement can surpass the short term from the perspective of authority allocation. Based on the theory of authority allocation, we establish an explanatory framework for the impact of authority allocation on the effect of campaign‐style enforcement. We argue that, through authority allocation, the central government has both formal authority and real authority, which helps to extend the effect of campaign‐style enforcement beyond the short term. We empirically studied the regulatory compliance in China's environmental administrative talk from 2014 to 2016. Statistical findings supported by robustness checks confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Further analysis shows that campaign‐style enforcement can be more effective when local officials have longer tenure, higher levels of education, or older age. Our paper shows that authority recentralization on specific issues can bridge the conflict of policy goals between central and local governments, prolonging the effect of campaign‐style enforcement.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.