Accusations of Russian hacking in the 2016 US presidential election has raised the salience of cyber security among the American public. However, there are still a number of unanswered questions about the circumstances under which particular policy responses are warranted in response to a cyber-attack and the public's attitudes about the conditions that justify this range of responses. This research investigates the attributes of a cyber-attack that affect public support for retaliation. It finds that cyber-attacks that produce American casualties dramatically increase support for retaliatory airstrikes compared to attacks with economic consequences. Assessments of attribution that have bipartisan support increase support to a lesser extent but for a broader range of retaliatory measures. The findings have important implications for ongoing debates about cyber security policy.
What role does the international audience play in nuclear crises? Scholars of nuclear crises and deterrence have treated nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. However, states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis. They also signal to a third actor—the international audience. There are two reasons for this. First, states care about their international social reputation and want to be perceived as responsible and legitimate actors. Second, there are material benefits to states maintaining a good social reputation with the international audience, which possesses the leverage to reward, condemn, and sanction. States thus attempt to leverage this power of the international audience to apply diplomatic pressure on their adversary during nuclear crises. They also engage in costly signaling and strategic restraint to ensure that the international audience considers their actions legitimate during the crisis. I use original qualitative evidence from the Kargil War (1999) between India and Pakistan to demonstrate this dynamic. Incorporating the international audience as a critical third actor during nuclear crises has important academic and policy implications for the study of nuclear crises and their management. ¿Qué función cumple el público internacional en las crisis nucleares? Los estudiosos de la disuasión y las crisis nucleares han tratado dichas crisis como interacciones diádicas entre dos lados. No obstante, los Estados no solo interactúan entre sí durante una crisis nuclear. También hacen señas a un tercer actor: el público internacional. Esto se debe a dos motivos. En primer lugar, los Estados se preocupan por su reputación social internacional y desean que se los perciba como actores responsables y legítimos. En segundo lugar, existen beneficios materiales para los Estados que mantienen una buena reputación social con el público internacional, el cual tiene influencia en la recompensación, la condena y la sanción. Por tanto, los Estados intentan aprovechar este poder del público internacional para aplicar presión diplomática en su adversario durante las crisis nucleares. También emplean un envío de señas costoso y restricciones estratégicas para garantizar que el público internacional considere sus acciones como legítimas durante la crisis. Utilizo pruebas cualitativas originales de la guerra de Kargil (1999) entre India y Pakistán para demostrar esta dinámica. La incorporación del público internacional como un tercer actor fundamental durante las crisis nucleares presenta importantes implicaciones académicas y políticas para el estudio de las crisis nucleares y su manejo. Quel rôle le public international joue-t-il dans les crises nucléaires? Les chercheurs se consacrant à la dissuasion et aux crises nucléaires ont traité les crises nucléaires comme étant des interactions dyadiques entre deux camps. Cependant, les États ne se contentent pas d'interagir l'un avec l'autre lors d'une crise nucléaire. Ils émettent également un signal à l'attention d'un acteur tiers, le public international. Il y a deux raisons à cela. D'une part, les États se soucient de leur réputation sociale internationale et souhaitent être perçus comme des acteurs responsables et légitimes. Et d'autre part, le maintien d'une bonne réputation sociale auprès du public international présente des avantages matériels pour les États puisque ce public dispose de l'influence nécessaire pour récompenser, condamner et sanctionner. Les États tentent donc de tirer parti de ce pouvoir du public international pour exercer une pression diplomatique sur leur adversaire lors de crises nucléaires. Ils s'engagent également dans un signal coûteux et dans une retenue stratégique pour veiller à ce que le public international considère leurs actions comme légitimes durant la crise. Je m'appuie sur des preuves qualitatives originales issues du conflit de Kargil (1999) entre l'Inde et le Pakistan pour démontrer cette dynamique. L'intégration du public international comme troisième acteur essentiel lors de crises nucléaires a d'importantes implications politiques et de recherche pour l’étude des crises nucléaires et de leur gestion.
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